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INTRODUCTION 
American policing, like American politics,1 is a decidedly local affair.2 While the 
image of federal “G-Men” might preoccupy the public imagination, in reality, local 
police have long dominated law enforcement,3 reflecting the needs, values, and char-
acteristics of the communities they serve,4 under circumstances “inextricably en-
meshed in local politics.”5  
Over time, however, local responsiveness has been tempered by two countervail-
ing forces. The first was the movement, beginning in the 1930s,6 to professionalize 
police forces and decouple departments from local political influence.7 The second 
has been the Supreme Court’s effort to exert federal constitutional control over state 
and local police, allowing the Court to confidently proclaim in 1961 that the Fourth 
Amendment was “enforceable in the same manner and to like effect” nationwide.8  
Of late, however, several leading criminal justice scholars have urged a different 
course, arguing that policing needs more, not less, local political influence, and that 
local preferences are deserving of judicial deference. One group, which I call the 
“New Democratists” because they inspire historic parallel to Jeffersonian ideals of 
localized, small-scale participatory governance in “little republics,”9 advocates judi-
                                                                                                             
 
 1. See THOMAS P. O’NEIL & GARY HYMEL, ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL AND OTHER RULES OF 
THE GAME (1994).  
 2. See Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 870, 877 (2015) (“[P]olice departments are overwhelmingly funded by local governments 
and governed by the local political process. Localism may be American policing’s most 
distinctive characteristic.”).  
 3. See SAMUEL WALKER & CHARLES M. KATZ, THE POLICE IN AMERICA: AN 
INTRODUCTION 62–63 (7th ed. 2011) (noting that of the roughly 18,000 law enforcement agen-
cies nationwide, almost 13,000 are local, rather than county, state, or federal).  
 4. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE § 1.10(c) (4th ed. 2015) (“[T]he criminal justice system was structured from the 
outset to ensure that the administration of the criminal law was responsive to the views of the 
local community. . . . [B]road grants of discretionary authority provided substantial leeway for 
administrative variations that reflected the differences in local communities.”).  
 5. EDWIN G. BURROWS & MIKE WALLACE, GOTHAM: A HISTORY OF NEW YORK CITY TO 
1898, at 638 (1999); see also William J. Stuntz, Terrorism, Federalism, and Police Misconduct, 
25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 665, 665 (2002) (“The defining characteristic of American criminal 
law enforcement—the characteristic that most distinguishes it from law enforcement elsewhere 
in the developed world—is its localism.”).  
 6. ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE 219–68 (1977); DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, 
DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 38 (2008); NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & 
ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON POLICE 1–5 (1931). 
 7. See, e.g., James Q. Wilson, The Police and Their Problems: A Theory, 12 PUB. POL’Y 
189, 191 (1963) (criticizing “political meddling . . . facilitated by local control of police forces”).  
 8. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).  
 9. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in 2 ADAMS-
JEFFERSON LETTERS: THE COMPLETE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND 
ABIGAIL AND JOHN ADAMS 390 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959); see also KERMIT HALL, THE MAGIC 
MIRROR 64 (1989) (observing that in the Framing Era “republicanism” commonly was “equated 
[with] localism and decentralization of power”). 
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cial deference to laws and policies resulting from local democratic processes. Ac-
cording to the chief proponents of this view, Professors Dan Kahan and Tracey 
Meares, constitutional regulation of discretionary policing should reflect “the values 
and insights of the communities in which such policing is taking place.”10 More re-
cently, Professor Andrew Taslitz argued that “Fourth Amendment law should vary 
based on geographic concerns,” because otherwise there comes risk of “silencing” 
local political sentiment, especially that of poor urban minority communities.11  
Another group, building upon the earlier work of Professor Anthony Amsterdam 
and others,12 which Professor Andrew Crespo has referred to as the “burgeoning” 
group of “New Administravists,”13 urges localization but looks less to direct democ-
racy than administrative rule making by local governments. Scholars in this camp 
maintain that courts, instead of assessing the substantive constitutional merits of a 
policy, should ask whether the process undertaken to craft the policy satisfied pre-
requisites of administrative rule making, such as public notice and comment proce-
dures.14 According to Professors Christopher Slobogin15 and Barry Friedman,16 
among others,17 shifting the policy-making locus is sensible both because police de-
partments are in fact executive agencies and doing so will promote governmental 
transparency, democratic accountability, and public engagement.18  
                                                                                                             
 
 10. Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal 
Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1184 (1998); see also Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The 
Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 197; cf. Laura I. Appleman, Local Democracy, Community Adjudication, and Criminal 
Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1413, 1418 (2017) (“Democratic localism is essential for the proper 
functioning of the criminal system because the criminal justice principles embodying substantive 
constitutional norms can only be defined through community interactions at the local level.”). 
 11. Andrew E. Taslitz, Fourth Amendment Federalism and the Silencing of the American 
Poor, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 277, 279 (2010). 
 12. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 
416–28 (1974); see also Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 
TEX. L. REV. 703, 725 (1974); Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative 
Regulations: The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment 
Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REV. 442 (1990); Carl McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 
MICH. L. REV. 659, 690 (1972).  
 13. Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal 
Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2058–59 (2016). 
 14. See id. at 2058 (“[T]he model would shift courts from serving as sources of substantive 
judicial oversight . . . courts would oversee the procedural validity of law enforcement behavior 
by determining whether the decisionmaking and conduct of such actors comply with basic 
standards of transparency and democratic accountability.” (emphasis in original)). 
 15. Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91 (2016).  
 16. Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827 
(2015).  
 17. E.g., Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515 
(2000); Eric J. Miller, Challenging Police Discretion, 58 HOW. L.J. 521 (2015); John Rappaport, 
Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 205 (2015); Daphna Renan, 
The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039 (2016); Andrew 
D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109 (2017).  
 18. See infra notes 151–167 and accompanying text.  
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Whether such benefits can actually be achieved remains open to question, given 
the significant political process concerns of small-scale governance identified by 
Madison19 and the political pathologies known to plague criminal justice policy mak-
ing more generally.20 Although the Supreme Court has expressed faith in the power 
of local political forces to curb police overreach,21 its faith has been tested by real-
world occurrences such as the NYPD’s “stop and frisk” policy, targeting mainly poor 
and minority neighborhoods,22 and discriminatory policing in Ferguson, Missouri,23 
and Baltimore, Maryland.24 
Yet even assuming that such difficulties can be overcome, an even more funda-
mental question looms:  should Fourth Amendment norms be localized? This Article 
seeks to press the pause button in the ongoing academic commentary and does so by 
tapping into legal literatures that have grown alongside (but distinct from) those just 
described. Professors David Barron25 and Richard Schragger26 have advocated “local 
constitutionalism,” positing the beneficial role that local preferences can play in 
shaping federal constitutional norms. Although they acknowledge that localities 
themselves are nonsovereign entities27 underserving of constitutional deference in a 
formal sense,28 like the criminal justice scholars noted above, they invoke the many 
instrumental benefits of decentralization.29  
                                                                                                             
 
 19. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 63–64 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(warning of the increased power of “factions” in small democratic units to “execute their plans 
of oppression”); see also Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 
1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 644, 646 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) 
(expressing same concern). 
 20. See David Jaros, Flawed Coalitions and the Politics of Crime, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1473 
(2014). 
 21. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 353 (2001) (attaching im-
portance to the “political accountability[] of most local lawmakers and law-enforcement 
officials”).  
 22. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  
 23. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 9–14 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/CB88-VUD8].  
 24. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE 
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT (2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/883366/download 
[https://perma.cc/Y6X9-W6EP].  
 25. David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 
147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 561–63 (1999). 
 26. Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors: The Case of Same-Sex 
Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147 (2005); Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the 
Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810 (2004).  
 27. See, e.g., David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 
377, 390 (2001) (“As a formal legal matter, the federal Constitution does not treat local gov-
ernments as anything approximating coequal sovereigns. States have the power to approve and 
establish local governments.”).  
 28. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964). 
 29. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 25, at 382 (“There is a value in ensuring that local juris-
dictions have the discretion to make the decisions that their residents wish them to make. The 
value inheres in the traditional advantages that attend decentralization. These include more 
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Similarly, Professor Mark Rosen has urged local “Tailoring” of constitutional 
norms.30 Rosen asserts that “One-Size-Fits-All is not an intrinsic part of American 
constitutionalism,”31 noting inter alia the “community standards” test employed by 
local juries when assessing whether material is obscene for First Amendment pur-
poses.32 Professor Joseph Blocher, in a recent Yale Law Journal article entitled 
Firearm Localism, applied the model to the Second Amendment, citing the historic 
prevalence of stricter gun control laws in urban areas and the existence of a less re-
strictive “gun culture” in rural areas.33 Finally, the Supreme Court has often deferred 
to local government preference when resolving constitutional questions34 in areas 
such as educational policy35 and land use and zoning,36 which, like policing,37 con-
stitute core aspects of local governance.38  
                                                                                                             
 
participatory and responsive government; more diversity of policy experimentation; more 
flexibility in responding to changing circumstances; and more diffusion of governmental 
power, which in turn checks tyranny.”).  
 30. See Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional 
Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1636 (2005) [hereinafter Rosen, Surprisingly Strong]; 
Mark D. Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution: Geographical Variations of Constitutional 
Requirements in the Aid of Community, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1129, 1169 (1999) [hereinafter Rosen, 
Nonuniform Constitution].  
 31. Rosen, Surprisingly Strong, supra note 30, at 1636.  
 32. Rosen, Nonuniform Constitution, supra note 30, at 1150 (citing and discussing 
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)). 
 33. See Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 85 (2013) (arguing that 
“future Second Amendment cases can and should incorporate the longstanding and sensible 
differences regarding guns and gun control in rural and urban areas, giving more protection to 
gun rights in rural areas and more leeway to gun regulation in cities”).  
 34. See Mark C. Gordon, Differing Paradigms, Similar Flaws: Constructing a New 
Approach to Federalism in Congress and the Court, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 218 (1996) 
(“Court decisions have recognized the key role of localities without explicitly saying so. This 
is particularly true when one considers the federalist values of local decision making, citizen 
participation, and responsiveness to diverse community needs, all of which occur far better on 
the municipal than on the state level.”). 
 35. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741–42 (1974) (“[L]ocal control over the 
operation of schools . . . has long been thought essential to the maintenance of community 
concern and support for public schools and to the quality of the educational process.”).  
 36. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440 (2002) 
(“[T]he Los Angeles City Council is in a better position than the judiciary to gather and eval-
uate data on local problems.”); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 297–98 (2000) (“The 
city council members, familiar with commercial downtown Erie . . . can make particularized, 
expert judgments about the resulting harmful secondary effects.”).  
 37. See DANIEL L. SKOLER, ORGANIZING THE NON-SYSTEM: GOVERNMENTAL 
STRUCTURING OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 77 (1977) (calling policing the most “local” of 
all criminal justice activities). 
 38. See ROBERT L. LINEBERRY, EQUALITY AND URBAN POLICY: THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
MUNICIPAL PUBLIC SERVICES 10 (1977) (“The services performed by municipalities are those 
most vital to the preservation of life (police, fire, sanitation, public health), liberty (police, 
courts, prosecutors), property (zoning, planning, taxing), and public enlightenment (schools, 
libraries).”).  
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If localism works for the First and Second Amendment, and for due process vis-
à-vis educational and land use policy, why not for policing and the Fourth 
Amendment doctrine that regulates it? Should localism be constitutionally 
transsubstantive, as the Fourth Amendment itself is relative to the substantive crim-
inal law?39 Or, are the privacy and bodily security rights and other critically 
important interests that the Fourth Amendment protects sufficiently distinct, such 
that they should not be allowed to hinge on the preferences of local political branch 
actors?  
This Article examines these and other questions and proceeds as follows. Part I 
examines the several ways in which Fourth Amendment rights already, as a practical 
matter, reflect localism. Variations in substantive criminal law among localities (not 
just states), for instance, directly affect the authority of police to search and seize 
individuals. So too do geographic differences and resources at the disposal of police 
departments.40 As a practical matter, contrary to the common assumption of the 
Court41 and commentators,42 Fourth Amendment rights can and already do differ 
among localities. 
Part II surveys the efforts of the criminal justice scholars noted above—the “New 
Democratists” and the “New Administrativists”—that would add to this variation in 
a new and significant way. Together, the groups make a compelling case for their 
own particular brand of localism: without question, increasing public input on polic-
ing policy and promoting governmental accountability and transparency are laudable 
goals. There should be no mistaking, however, the radical quality of their proposed 
changes. Advocates not only would have the political branches, not courts, be the 
primary expositors of limits on police authority.43 They would also have the locus of 
constitutional understanding be pushed “all the way down” to local governments,44 
                                                                                                             
 
 39. See William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth 
Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842 (2001).  
 40. See infra Part I. 
 41. See infra notes 55–58 and accompanying text. 
 42. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Effect of Legislation on Fourth Amendment Protection, 
115 MICH. L. REV. 1117, 1145 (2017) (“The Fourth Amendment is one size-fits-all. A rule that 
applies to the Grainfield, Kansas, police department also applies at the FBI Headquarters in 
Washington, D.C.”).  
 43. This is a position recently advanced by some vis-à-vis Congress and state legislatures 
regarding police use of emerging technologies that affect privacy interests. E.g., Riley v. 
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth 
Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 801 (2004). But see, e.g., Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal 
Justice System: Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law 
Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH. L. REV. 485, 533–37 (2013) (noting that legislatures are 
often dominated by law enforcement interests and the unwillingness of legislatures to amend 
“obviously flawed and outdated provisions”).  
 44. Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the 
Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 23 (2010) (asserting that “localities represent better sites for 
pursuing federalism’s values because they are closer to the people, offer more realistic options 
for voting with one’s feet, and map more closely into communities of interest.” (emphasis in 
original)). 
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affording localities not only the power to enforce constitutional norms (itself a con-
troversial proposition),45 but actually to define them. 
Part III considers the benefits and detriments of Fourth Amendment localism. To 
advocates, a chief virtue of localism lies in its capacity to tailor constitutional norms 
to local needs and preferences, resulting in a possible broadening of constitutional 
protection.46 History teaches, however, that local government public safety policies, 
certainly including policing, can be harsh and repressive, and localism would ascribe 
constitutional weight to such policies. More problematic still, in time, local political 
actors, mindful that courts will defer if democratic or administrative processes appear 
adequate, could well be emboldened to adopt even more repressive policies.  
Another potential benefit of localism is that it holds promise of beneficial exper-
imentation, akin to that envisioned by Justice Brandeis,47 and more recently 
invoked by Professors Dorf and Sabel in their model of “democratic 
experimentalism.”48 The benefits of experimentalism, however, hinge on the 
wherewithal of policy makers and the subject matter in question. Local 
governments number in the tens of thousands49 and vary significantly in their 
capabilities and resources.50 This not only raises concern about the quality of 
experiments undertaken; it creates conditions ripe for freeriding if localities simply 
replicate one another’s policies, which is itself an outcome inconsistent with the 
experimentalist enterprise.  
Finally, localism might be embraced because it serves to enhance the overall sat-
isfaction of citizens, who as Charles Tiebout famously theorized will choose to 
reside in communities that best satisfy their preferences.51 Indeed, because it is 
often easier to exit a locality than a state or nation, localism would appear to have 
promise. Yet the comparative ease of relocation is often less than it seems, 
especially for poor community members, who frequently bear the brunt of policing 
policy. Even more problematic, the Tieboutian model fails to take into account the 
propensity of local governments to impose negative externalities on their peers. 
                                                                                                             
 
 45. See Kathleen S. Morris, The Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement, 47 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2012).  
 46. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 25, at 611 (asserting that “[b]y broadening the range of 
permissible constitutional interpreters, local constitutionalism might broaden the range of con-
stitutional protections”).  
 47. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing). 
 48. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).  
 49. Today there are over 90,000 local government units of varied size and nature. 
CARMA HOGUE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION SUMMARY REPORT: 
2012 (2013), http://www2.census.gov/govs/cog/g12_org.pdf [https://perma.cc/9V7J-
QDNC].  
 50. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, DAWN CLARK NETSCH, PETER W. SALSICH, JR. & 
JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 32 (5th ed. 
2002) (“A basic fact about local governments in the United States is their great diversity 
with respect to such matters as legal nature, size, area, functions, and organizations, both 
within and among states . . . .”). 
 51. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 416 
(1956).  
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Unlike taxes, public parks, and other local public goods, criminal justice policy 
(including policing) can be motivated by a desire to expel or discourage entry of 
individuals, which raises race-to-the-bottom concerns.  
Part IV considers whether Fourth Amendment localism is nevertheless viable 
in some shape or form.52 It makes the case that the Fourth Amendment is not a 
good candidate, highlighting the many important ways in which the cluster of 
rights it protects differs in kind from other Bill of Rights provisions, the First and 
Second Amendments in particular. Judicial deference becomes even more 
problematic when one considers that the Supreme Court has long refused to 
second-guess political branch decisions concerning the reach of criminal codes,53 
which enable and condition the authority of police to search and seize individuals.54 
Given this exceptionalism, if localism is to have a place anywhere in constitu-
tional norm making it should be in elevating the scope of Fourth Amendment pro-
tections afforded individuals. Doing so would avoid the many difficulties created by 
unqualified localism, such as when an individual travels to a right-restrictive locality 
and, without notice, is subject to a diminution in Fourth Amendment rights. It would 
also achieve the many instrumental benefits of localism, such as public participation, 
governmental accountability, and transparency. Under the more circumscribed ap-
proach advocated, no dilution of individual rights would occur; indeed, if the local 
experiment caught on with other localities, there would be an aggregate increase in 
constitutional protection. While effectuating such a change would not be free of dif-
ficulty, it would enable Fourth Amendment doctrine to secure the benefits of local-
ism yet avoids its many pitfalls. 
I. SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Since the nation’s origin, a tenet of federal constitutional law has been that rights 
apply uniformly nationwide,55 avoiding “arbitrarily variable protection.”56 To allow 
otherwise would “change the uniform ‘law of the land’ into a crazy quilt,”57 leading 
to “jarring and discordant judgements” that Justice Story thought “deplorable.”58  
                                                                                                             
 
 52. As Robert Mikos has observed, “[T]he case for or against localism is rarely as clear 
cut as in the highly stylized hypothetical commonly employed in the classroom.” Robert A. 
Mikos, Marijuana Localism, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 719, 726 (2015).  
 53. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996) (refusing to identify when a 
criminal code might become so “exorbitant” as to justify constitutional regulation).  
 54. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.  
 55. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 416 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) 
(averring the “necessity of uniformity” regarding federal constitutional matters); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 2, at 38–39 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[W]e have uniformly 
been one people; each individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same national rights, privi-
leges, protection.”).  
 56. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 154 (2004).  
 57. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 185 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also State v. 
Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 816 (N.J. 1990) (O’Hern, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“The fourth amendment is the fourth amendment. It ought not to mean one thing in Trenton 
and another across the Delaware River in Morrisville, Pennsylvania.”).   
 58. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 348 (1816) (Story, J.).  
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In reality, however, federal constitutional rights, perhaps especially in the Fourth 
Amendment context, have always varied.59 Evidence of this dates back to the 
Framing Era, when the search and seizure authority of federal agents depended on 
the preferences of first colonial and then state governments.60 Today, subnational 
variation stems from a variety of sources, including the differing views of courts. 
While state and lower federal courts must defer to the nation’s “one Supreme 
Court,”61 they can vary on Fourth Amendment questions not decided by the Court.62 
And even with matters ostensibly decided by the Court, lower courts have interpre-
tative latitude.63  
In sum, Fourth Amendment law resembles something less that an invariable 
judge-made “detailed code of criminal procedure.”64 This Part elaborates on this em-
piric reality, and does so by shifting focus, examining the many even more organic 
ways, from the bottom up, that police search and seizure authority—and thus the 
Fourth Amendment rights of citizens—can vary.  
A. Substantive Law 
Criminal codes at once reflect the normative preferences of a jurisdiction and 
condition the search and seizure authority of its police. As Professor Wayne 
LaFave long ago recognized, “the substantive criminal law is not merely a list of 
‘thou-shall-nots’ directed at the citizenry; it is also in large measure a definition of 
                                                                                                             
 
 59. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 280 (2008) (noting that “[n]onuniformity 
is . . . an unavoidable reality in a federalist system” and asserting that a “fundamental interest” 
exists in preserving subnational authority that cannot be constrained by “any general, unde-
fined federal interest in uniformity”).  
 60. See Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, The Contingent Fourth Amendment, 64 EMORY 
L.J. 1229 (2015). 
 61. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 160 
(1825) (“[T]he construction given by this Court to the constitution and laws of the United 
States is received by all as the true construction . . . .”).  
 62. See Wayne A. Logan, A House Divided: When State and Lower Federal Courts 
Disagree on Federal Constitutional Rights, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235 (2014) (discussing 
varied Fourth Amendment positions adopted by state appellate courts and federal circuit 
courts within the same circuit based on concurrent federal constitutional interpretive au-
thority); see also Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and 
the Fourth Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137 (2012) (discussing varied Fourth 
Amendment positions adopted by different federal circuit courts of appeal).  
 63. See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects 
of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1994) (“Deciding what a 
precedent means will frequently depend on the particular normative values and assumptions 
each judge brings to the interpretive enterprise.”); see also Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts 
Unbound, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 501 (2008) (noting instances where state courts strayed from 
Court doctrine); Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Leaky Floors: State Law Below 
Federal Constitutional Limits, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 227 (2008) (noting instances where state 
courts apply doctrine in a narrower fashion than the Court).  
 64. Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. 
REV. 929, 953 (1965).  
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the job of the several police agencies in the state.”65 Because of this, variations in 
criminal codes affect the power of police to search and seize individuals.  
In contrast to areas such as commercial law, which have become increasingly 
homogeneous over time,66 criminal law is marked by considerable diversity: 
“crimes,” the Supreme Court observed in Rochin v. California, “are what the laws 
of the individual States make them.”67 Variation exists not only in the particular 
behaviors criminalized68 but also in the definitions of mutually proscribed 
misconduct.69 States also vary in the punishments they prescribe, which can affect 
the power of police to conduct warrantless entries of suspects’ homes70 and conduct 
investigative stops.71  
Importantly, moreover, localities within states enjoy significant criminal law-
making authority.72 Operating pursuant to delegated home rule authority73 and sub-
ject to the only modest limits typically imposed by state preemption doctrine,74 local 
governments enact distinct laws, or modify existing state laws, tailored to their 
unique conditions and challenges.75 Adding to this diversity, urban localities in par-
ticular in recent years have enacted laws operative within particular “zones,” afford-
ing police increased enforcement wherewithal for misconduct such as prostitution 
and drug-related offenses.76  
                                                                                                             
 
 65. Wayne R. LaFave, Penal Code Revision: Considering the Problems and Practices of 
the Police, 45 TEX. L. REV. 434, 436 (1967).  
 66. See Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265, 267 (2003) 
(noting that state commercial law “has become close to a single, unified body of law”).  
 67. 342 U.S. 165, 168 (1952).  
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 69. See Wayne A. Logan, Creating a “Hydra in Government”: Federal Recourse to State 
Law in Crime Fighting, 86 B.U. L. REV. 65, 76–77 (2006).  
 70. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 (1984) (terming punishment the “best 
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 71. See, e.g., Gaddis ex rel. Gaddis v. Redford Twp., 364 F.3d 763, 771 n.6 (6th Cir. 
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meanor).  
 72. For fuller discussion of this phenomenon, see Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal 
Law of Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1409 (2001).  
 73. See DALE KRANE, PLATON N. RIGOS & MELVIN HILL, HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A 
FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 2 (2001) (“[T]he ideal of home rule is defined as the ability of a local 
government to act and make policy in all areas that have not been designated to be of statewide 
interest through general law, state constitutional provisions, or initiatives and referenda.”). On 
the varied nature and extent of home rule authority exercised by local governments, see Paul 
Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1125–27 (2007).  
 74. See generally Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, 22 J.L. & 
POL. 1, 17–27 (2006) (discussing limited state exercise of preemption authority).  
 75. See 1 SANDRA M. STEVENSON, ANTIEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 21.05[2], at 
21–22 (2d ed. 2000) (“The reality is that state legislatures seldom legislate on all or general 
concerns, and a social and political vacuum would exist if a home rule entity desired to impose 
controls on those matters within its own borders and was not permitted to do so.”).  
 76. Robert L. Scharff, Note, An Analysis of Municipal Drug and Prostitution Exclusion 
Zones, 15 GEO. MASON C.R.L.J. 321 (2005).  
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Finally, localities contribute to variability by opting out of otherwise applicable 
state criminal law. Perhaps the most notable recent example of this relates to posses-
sion of small amounts of marijuana. While several states have legalized or decrimi-
nalized possession,77 localities in states where possession remains a crime have either 
decriminalized possession78 or directed local police to accord it a “lowest law en-
forcement priority.”79  
In short, the substantive law authority of police to search and seize varies consid-
erably not only between states, but among localities within states, resulting in corre-
sponding variation in Fourth Amendment protections. 
B. Geography 
Another factor driving Fourth Amendment variability is place. To begin, not only 
do the Amendment’s protections typically not apply outside the United States,80 but 
they are limited at and near the nation’s borders.81 At the border, individuals are sub-
ject to routine detention without individualized suspicion of wrongdoing,82 and the 
“thumbs are on the scale” in assessing whether reasonable suspicion exists to seize 
individuals near borders.83 As the Court noted in Arvizu v. United States,84 “[w]e 
think it quite reasonable that a driver’s [behaviors] . . . might well be unremarkable 
in one instance (such as a busy San Francisco highway) while quite unusual in an-
other (such as a remote portion of rural southeastern Arizona).”85 By the same token, 
individuals on boats, depending on location, can enjoy lessened Fourth Amendment 
protection,86 as do individuals at domestic airports.87 
Being associated with a particular state can also have an impact on one’s rights. 
Anyone visiting Florida, for instance, should be aware that the Sunshine State is a 
“drug source state,” which can affect police assessments of possible criminal activ-
ity.88 Similarly, a car with California license plates can raise justifiable suspicion 
                                                                                                             
 
 77. See Main: State Info, NORML http://norml.org/states [https://perma.cc/D85J-
WPFG].  
 78. See Wayne A. Logan, After the Cheering Stopped: Decriminalization and Legalism’s 
Limits, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 319, 326 (2014).  
 79. Lowest Law Enforcement Priority Jurisdictions, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT, 
https://www.mpp.org/lowest-law-enforcement-priority-jurisdictions [https://perma.cc/74F9-
GLCA].  
 80. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274–75 (1990); see also 
Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 364 (2015) (noting that 
“territoriality is a critical factor in assessing both the reach of the Fourth Amendment and the 
scope of the government’s authority to search and seize”).  
 81. See generally 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.5 (5th ed. 2015).  
 82. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985).  
 83. Id. at 558. 
 84. 534 U.S. 266 (2002). 
 85. Id. at 275–76.  
 86. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983).  
 87. See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 374 F. Supp. 2d 513, 521 (E.D. Ky. 2005). 
 88. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 (1983).  
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when the car is in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in December.89 So too can traveling be-
tween particular cities.90  
Where one is located in a particular community can also be important, especially 
if the area is a “high crime area.”91 In Illinois v. Wardlow, the Court made this clear 
when it held that while running from police alone does not suffice as a basis for 
police to stop an individual, flight in a high crime area does.92 As a consequence, as 
one commentator recently observed, “the young man in the Bronx gets bent over a 
patrol car while the young man in Upper Manhattan jogs home unmolested.”93  
Policing, moreover, is known to concentrate on particular public spaces; a person 
on a street corner is more likely to catch the eye of police than an individual inside a 
building or within a gated community. Privacy, as William Stuntz noted, “is some-
thing that exists only in certain types of spaces; not surprisingly, the law protects it 
only where it exists.”94 A person able to buy or rent a stand-alone house, with a yard 
qualifying as physical curtilage, enjoys more privacy protection than someone resid-
ing in an apartment building with a common hallway.95 “[I]t is simple realism,” Judge 
Posner wrote, “that people who live in rural areas or have wealth will have more 
physical privacy than people who live in cities . . . and that therefore they will derive 
more protection from the Fourth Amendment.”96  
Finally, variation is baked into the Fourth Amendment by institutional and gov-
ernmentally demarcated space. The Supreme Court has held, for instance, that public 
school students have a lowered expectation of privacy when at school.97 Authorities 
wishing to search them need only have “reasonable grounds” (not probable cause) to 
believe they violated a law or school rule.98 Likewise, individuals entering special 
enclaves such as military bases99 and tribal lands100 enjoy a lowered expectation of 
privacy. 
                                                                                                             
 
 89. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).  
 90. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 3 (1989); see also Charles E. Cox, Jr., 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 65 MERCER L. REV. 891, 899 n.76 (2014) (citing other 
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 92. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124.  
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 95. See id. at 1270.  
 96. United States v. Redmon, 138 F.3d 1109, 1132 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, J., dissenting).  
 97. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656–57 (1995).  
 98. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–42 (1985).  
 99. See, e.g., United States v. McCarthy, 38 M.J. 398, 401–03 (C.M.A. 1993) (upholding 
right of military police to conduct warrantless searches on military bases).  
 100. See, e.g., Hopi Tribe v. Kahe, 21 Indian L. Rep. 6079, 6079–80 (Hopi Tribal Ct. 1994) 
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C. Resources 
Variability in Fourth Amendment rights can also stem from basic local differences 
in resources. Like other aspects of the criminal justice system,101 policing is highly 
sensitized to resources and decisions regarding their allocation. More police on the 
payroll correlates with more police deployed to search and seize, and department or 
even precinct-level tactical deployment decisions affect when, how, and where po-
lice-citizen contact occurs.102  
A department’s financial wherewithal to purchase technological tools can also 
significantly affect the likelihood of being searched and seized.103 Today, over 
ninety percent of police departments serving jurisdictions of 250,000 or more 
residents employ “crime mapping” technology, allowing police to direct attention 
and resources to particular areas,104 yet only sixty percent of smaller jurisdiction 
agencies do so.105 Similar variation is evident with “predictive policing” 
technologies, which employ computer software to analyze large data sets from 
disparate sources to predict where criminal activity might occur.106 Finally, access 
to technology can affect the duration of police seizures,107 as well as their 
intrusiveness, given variations in department access to military-grade equipment 
and readiness to deploy SWAT teams.108  
                                                                                                             
 
(stating that the probable cause standard for searches and seizures is to be based on consider-
ations unique to the Hopi Tribe).  
 101.  Funding for provision of counsel to indigent criminal defendants is one notable ex-
ample. See Lisa R. Pruitt & Beth A. Colgan, Justice Deserts: Spatial Inequality and Local 
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 107. See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1618 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
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 108. See Kara Dansky, Local Democratic Oversight of Police Militarization, 10 HARV. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 59 (2016); see also Bruce Smith, Prosecutor: Death of Man Shot by Police Was 
‘Senseless,’ SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Jan. 7, 2015, 12:05 AM), http://www.sandiegounion 
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382 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 93:369 
 
* * * 
In short, even though the Supreme Court presumes that the Fourth Amendment 
applies uniformly across the land,109 and refuses to consider that Fourth 
Amendment rights should be allowed to “vary from place to place,”110 the empiric 
reality is that Fourth Amendment rights do vary. Next, the discussion turns to the 
work of scholars whose recommendations would add to this diversity in a new and 
significant way.  
II. THE LOCALISTS 
Fourth Amendment doctrine has long been the target of harsh criticism. In 1971, 
Justice Harlan, pointing to “serious distortions and incongruities,” urged that it be 
“overhaul[ed].”111 Over time, multiple commentators have joined in the critique,112 
condemning inter alia the Supreme Court’s reliance upon and faulty understanding 
of Framing Era history,113 its efforts to define what qualifies as “unreasonable,”114 
and understanding of the Amendment’s basic purpose.115 They have also lamented 
what has been called the “incredible shrinking Fourth Amendment,”116 which too 
often tilts in favor of police authority,117 and its frequent divorce from real-world 
                                                                                                             
 
 109. See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text.  
 110. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996).  
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empirics.118 Worse yet, the Court has struggled, not altogether successfully, to craft 
doctrine amid rapidly changing technologies expanding police authority.119  
In response, scholars have advanced a variety of institutional options less depend-
ent on judicial prerogative. This Part surveys two foremost efforts taking shape in 
recent years, one urging reliance on the outcomes of direct democracy, exercised by 
local political bodies, the other looking to laws and regulations adopted by local ad-
ministrative rule-making authorities.  
A. “New Democratists” 
In the late 1990s, Professors Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares authored a series of 
provocative articles urging direct democratic control over the regulation of police. 
Focusing in particular on urban areas, Kahan and Meares argued that poor and mi-
nority residents in such areas wielded greater political voice and influence than in 
the past and that police forces and leadership were increasingly diversified, alleviat-
ing historic concern over enactment of laws permitting police overreach.120 They also 
asserted that local democratic preferences warranted deference both because they 
reflected local needs and conditions121 and because the risk of abusive policies being 
adopted was lessened as their effects would be internalized by the community it-
self.122 Kahan and Meares reasoned that “insofar as [local] policies do burden aver-
age members of the community, there is much less reason for courts to doubt the 
determination of politically accountable officials that these policies strike a fair bal-
ance between liberty and order.”123  
Entitling their article The Coming Crisis in Criminal Procedure, Kahan and 
Meares wrote that it was “now time to construct a new criminal procedure, one 
uniquely fitted to the conditions that currently characterize American social and po-
litical life and that are likely to characterize it into the foreseeable future.”124 In this 
new regime, judicial aversion for local democracy was no longer warranted.125 New 
doctrine must “recognize the legitimate function of discretionary policing techniques 
                                                                                                             
 
 118. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 227 (2015); Lee 
Epstein, Barry Friedman & Geoffrey R. Stone, Foreword: Testing the Constitution, 90 N.Y.U. 
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 121. Id. at 1161–65, 1177–80.  
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in combatting inner-city crime, and also the competence of inner-city communities 
to protect themselves from abusive police behavior.”126 Kahan and Meares urged 
connect[ing] constitutional doctrine to the values and insights of the 
communities in which such policing is taking place . . . . A doctrine that 
listens to the answers of the citizens who have the most at stake would 
be the beginning of both wisdom and legitimacy for a new regime of 
criminal procedure.127  
Later that same year, after the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated an anti-gang 
loitering ordinance enacted by the Chicago City Council,128 Professors Meares and 
Kahan published a follow-up article condemning the court’s decision as a relic of 
“antiquated procedural thinking.”129 They traced the political history of the ordi-
nance, distinguishing it from instances in the past when, in the South especially, “in-
stitutionalized racism fully justified the Court’s suspicion of democratic politics.”130 
Meares and Kahan advocated a new constitutional calculus, one requiring judicial 
deference when the effect of a local law is felt by local denizens themselves: “Instead 
of viewing all law-enforcement techniques with suspicion, courts should ask whether 
the community has internalized the burden that a particular law imposes on individ-
ual freedom. If it has, the court should presume that the law does not violate individ-
ual rights.”131 
Their arguments did not go unchallenged. Professors Albert Alschuler and 
Stephen Schulhofer disputed the history of the Chicago ordinance provided by 
Meares and Kahan, asserting that it was in fact controversial and contested by various 
community groups.132 They also warned of the “appealing but highly manipulable 
rhetoric of ‘community,’” with its “attractions of a sense of place, shared values, and 
neighborhood empowerment.”133 “Which community counts,” they asked, “the mi-
nority community or the residents of the highest crime wards? And what procedures 
should be used to sort through the conflicting preferences held by members of either 
one of these groups?”134 Even more fundamentally, Alschuler and Schulhofer ar-
gued, “[o]ur Constitution does not permit a majority to limit individual rights simply 
by offering to share the burden.”135 The Framers “enacted a Constitution that guar-
anteed rights, not to collectivities, but to individuals.”136  
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Professor David Cole similarly disputed the premise that the changing composi-
tion of urban police departments diminished the threat of police overreach.137 This 
was because “someone will always be the loser [in police enforcement], and [] the 
losers will generally be those without effective political power.”138 Cole also dis-
missed the view that the potential for abuse was mitigated because communities 
shared a “linked fate,” inasmuch as the “average citizen” would not be the typical 
target of police.139 Finally, he reasoned, that deference “to ‘the community’ means 
simply to favor the majority’s interests over the minority’s within that community, 
hardly a principled way to resolve a constitutional dispute.”140  
Professor Alafair Burke, drawing on her experience as a “neighborhood prosecu-
tor” in Portland, Oregon, questioned whether equal access and participation can be 
ensured, noting that even the appearance of consensus was often illusory.141 This is 
because “every community, however defined, has its outsiders ‘whose complaints 
are least likely to be heard by the rest of the community.’”142 Burke noted how she 
would “massag[e] public perception of the community,”143 adding that policies 
adopted themselves might not truly reflect community preference, but rather  
may very well be viewed by the community as the lesser of policy evils 
in a world where politically feasible alternatives are limited by the 
broader majority. . . . [I]nner-city communities do not—even with the 
increased political power that Kahan and Meares attribute to them—have 
the ability to shape the governance of their communities as they might 
truly see fit.144 
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Despite the foregoing criticisms, democratic localism in criminal justice policy 
has its proponents. In two recent books, Professors William Stuntz145 and Stephanos 
Bibas146 urged that local government actors and citizens play a more prominent pol-
icy-making role.147 Professor Andrew Taslitz, in turn, has argued that “Fourth 
Amendment law should vary based on geographic concerns,” because otherwise 
there comes risk of “silenc[ing] the political voice of poor urban racial minorities” 
who enjoy most political influence within the local (not state or federal) legislative 
arenas.148  
B. “New Administrativists” 
Charting an alternate course, several scholars have urged that courts defer to rules 
regulating police when the rules result from local executive and quasi-executive en-
tities. In Democratic Policing,149 Professor Barry Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko 
mounted arguably the broadest argument in this vein, focusing on “enforcement 
methods,” such as use of drones, car license plate readers, and other bulk data sur-
veillance tools, or “Stingrays”; police resort to Tasers and pepper spray; use of drunk-
driving checkpoints; and knock-and-announce.150  
Friedman and Ponomarenko assert that “[i]t is both unacceptable and unwise for 
[law enforcement agencies] to remain aloof from the democratic processes that apply 
to the rest of agency government . . . policing policies and practices should be gov-
erned through transparent democratic processes such as legislative authorization and 
public rulemaking.”151 Doing so is necessary not only because of the judiciary’s fail-
                                                                                                             
 
 145. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011).  
 146. STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2012).  
 147. See, e.g., id. at 146–47 (urging “[c]ollaborative, open decision-making, in consultation 
with local residents” in a variety of policy areas, which would promote community buy-in and 
temper police overreach, citing Meares and Kahan in support); STUNTZ, supra note 145, at 283 
(“Local neighborhoods should exercise more power . . . as they once did.”); see also Richard A. 
Bierschbach, Fragmentation and Democracy in the Constitutional Law of Punishment, 111 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1437, 1452 (2017) (“In reviewing local laws, policies, and police and prosecutorial 
actions, judges might consider the degree to which they reflect community or neighborhood 
preferences based on inclusive, responsive, and autonomous processes, deferring more to those 
that do.”). 
 148. Taslitz, supra note 11, at 279–80. Building upon this faith, one student commentator 
recently urged that city councils designate particular spaces as “high crime areas” per Wardlow. 
Dammann, supra note 93, at 574 (“[A]s a democratically elected body, city councils’ high-crime 
designations would carry the weight of the political process and would thus be more deserving 
of judicial deference.”); id. at 577 (“[T]he democratically elected representatives of those citizens 
should have a voice in deciding whether their Fourth Amendment rights will be diminished.”). 
 149. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 16.  
 150. Id. at 1848, 1851, 1878, 1883.  
 151. Id. at 1832. While they mainly focus on administrative agency-like processes, the au-
thors maintain that democratic authorization, however obtained, is what is important. See id. 
at 1834 (“Such authorization can come through specific legislation. It can be the product of 
administrative notice-and-comment rulemaking, in which public participation is welcomed. 
Or . . . new means of soliciting democratic engagement may be required.”). 
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ure to effectively regulate police; it is because “judicial review . . . can never substi-
tute for popular control. The regulation of police involves profound policy questions 
that must be resolved in democratically accountable ways.”152 Moreover, “opening 
rulemaking to local community participation will bring voices into the process that 
may have had no outlet thus far. . . . [T]hose who live in heavily-policed communities 
have strong views about police practices. . . . What they lack is a formal mechanism 
through which to make their voices heard.”153  
The authors acknowledge that local policy outcomes will not always favor civil 
liberties. However, they reason that “[i]f existing rules are too deferential to the in-
terests of police . . . it is hard to see that they will necessarily get worse. The hope is 
that with public participation, controversial practices will be moved in a better direc-
tion.”154 When addressing the constitutionality of a regulation, courts should “focus 
on identifying [political] process failures, should refuse to defer to policing actions 
that lack a sufficient democratic pedigree, and offer safe harbors for those that are 
authorized through democratic means.”155  
More recently, Professor Christopher Slobogin has urged judicial deference to lo-
cal administrative rules in the narrower context of programmatic searches and sei-
zures, such as auto roadblocks, drug-testing programs, DNA sampling, and mass data 
collection (which he collectively refers to as “panvasive”).156 In Policing as 
Administration, Slobogin asserts that the litmus test for assessing the constitutional-
ity of a regulation should be whether the requisites of the administrative law-making 
process are satisfied.157 Like Friedman and Ponomarenko, Slobogin identifies a num-
ber of crucial instrumental benefits accruing:  
[Applying administrative law] principles would improve democratic ac-
countability and counter the usual law enforcement orientation of legis-
lative bodies by requiring public input prior to implementation, agency 
rationalization of the program, implementation that is both consistent 
with the stated rationale and that is evenhandedly carried out, and legis-
lative authorization that is sufficiently specific to satisfy a court that a 
representative body considers the program permissible.158  
A court faced with a challenge to a policy regulation would apply a “hard look” 
standard of review, first asking whether the local rule making is legislatively 
                                                                                                             
 
 152. Id. at 1836.  
 153. Id. at 1879–80.  
 154. Id. at 1879.  
 155. Id. at 1836.  
 156. Christopher Slobogin, supra note 15, at 93; id. at 96 (“Because . . . panvasive searches 
and seizures are policy-driven, group-based, and suspicionless, they are legislative in nature. 
They are carried out in aid of a generally applicable regime that, if promulgated by any other 
agency, would be considered a form of rule governed by administrative law principles.”). 
 157. Id. at 95 (“[C]onstitutional law should largely be beside the point. . . . Instead, the 
concrete rules governing panvasive techniques should be viewed through the entirely different 
prism of administrative law.”).  
 158. Id. at 149; see also id. at 152 (asserting that the foregoing requirements, “enforced by 
the courts, would be consistent with the Fourth Amendment’s central goal—embodied in its 
reasonableness requirement”).  
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authorized159 and then assessing “whether the police department has followed a 
rational procedure that produced a rational policy consistent with legislative 
directives and whether the policy is implemented in an evenhanded manner.”160  
Professor Erik Luna in an earlier article also urged an administrative path, advo-
cating adoption of “enforcement principles” to guide discretionary decisions of po-
lice regarding enforcement low-level offenses.161 Luna outlined a process whereby 
police leaders and various public officials identify “troublesome areas of selective 
enforcement,” and generate principles to guide enforcement of such offenses, which 
would “be publicized and feedback would be solicited from community members in 
an open forum or town meeting.”162 “Based on community input and political debate, 
law enforcement would formally and publicly adopt those principles that withstood 
scrutiny and would instruct frontline officers on the import and application of the 
principles.”163 With greater transparency and citizen participation, Luna reasoned, 
would come increased community respect for legal commands and for the police that 
enforce them.164  
More recently, Professor John Rappaport urged “[s]hifting rulemaking responsi-
bility from the Court to political actors” to “writ[e] conduct rules to govern street-
level officers.”165 Doing so will allow community buy-in, experimentation, and the 
tailoring of police regulations to “local needs and resources.”166 Andrew Selbst, fo-
cusing in particular on use of predictive policing methods involving “big data,” ad-
vocated judicial reliance on the expertise of local departments in the development of 
algorithms informed by public input.167 
                                                                                                             
 
 159. Such legislation, for instance, regarding auto checkpoints or license plate recognition 
systems, would specify the “‘persons or activities’” to be regulated, and the “‘harm’” to be 
prevented. Id. at 148.  
 160. Id. at 121; see also id. at 135 (“[T]he most pertinent aspects of [administrative] law 
for panvasive police conduct are the notice-and-comment requirement, the requirement that 
rules be adequately explained in writing, the requirement that rules be implemented even-
handedly, and the requirement that rules not exceed the relevant legislative authorization.”). 
Professor Slobogin notes that local governments are not typically subject to the require-
ments of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), but asserts that “they are not necessarily 
immune from the dictates of administrative procedure.” Id. at 121 n.153; see also id. at 135 
(arguing that local departments should be subject to the APA when “carrying out panvasive 
actions in service of state or federal criminal law”).  
 161. Luna, supra note 17.  
 162. Id. at 603.  
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. at 527; see also Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1167 
(2000) (“By expounding guidelines in an open forum, subject to public commentary and de-
bate, law enforcement . . . empowers the citizenry through sharing information and collabo-
rating on appropriate policing principles.”).  
 165. Rappaport, supra note 17, at 212, 232.  
 166. Id. at 236. 
 167. Selbst, supra note 17, at 182. 
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C. Summary  
Taken together, the foregoing scholarly camps, while each advocating a shift 
away from judge-centric decision making, chart distinct paths. The New 
Democratists urge judicial deference to local democratic preferences regarding both 
discretionary (“suspicion-based”) policing targeting individuals and programmatic 
(i.e., “suspicionless”) searches focusing on the public as a whole,168 despite the sig-
nificant political process difficulties noted earlier.169 
New Administrativists, for their part, urge deference to rules and regulations gen-
erated by local government administrative units, yet at times (Professor Slobogin in 
particular) limit their focus to programmatic policing. Friedman and Ponomarenko 
maintain that courts should defer when “police decisions about enforcement methods 
. . . represent considered, fact-based judgment formulated with democratic input.”170 
They should “only refuse to accord deference to policing rules that lack a democratic 
pedigree”171 and are not the “product of sound democratic processes.”172 They em-
phasize that no deference should be accorded when there exists “constitutional 
doubt” about a policy, yet fail to specify when such scrutiny should be triggered. 
They also fail to specify what precisely qualifies as a “democratic pedigree” or when 
“sound democratic processes” are in evidence.173  
For Professor Slobogin, so long as administrative rule-making prerequisites are 
satisfied, “constitutional law should largely be beside the point . . . functioning 
only as a backstop protection for fundamental liberties and as an exhortation that 
panvasive actions be reasonable.”174 Again, it remains unclear when a court’s con-
stitutional oversight role would be triggered but it is evident that local government 
compliance with administrative law expectations neutralizes cause for searching 
judicial scrutiny.175 Nor are the procedural trappings of such a regime spelled out 
                                                                                                             
 
 168. See infra notes 120–131 and accompanying text.  
 169. See supra notes 132–148 and accompanying text.  
 170. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 16, at 1892.  
 171. Id. at 1901. 
 172. Id. at 1898. 
 173. On the tendency of voters to lack knowledge regarding the policy positions taken by 
their local candidates and officials more generally, see David Schleicher, Why Is There No 
Partisan Competition in City Council Elections?: The Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 
419 (2007). 
 174. Slobogin, supra note 15, at 95.  
 175. See id. (stating that the “concrete rules governing panvasive techniques should be 
viewed through the entirely different prism of administrative law”); id. at 134 (“[A] rule that 
has cleared the relevant administrative law hurdles might [be] provide[d] a constitutional safe 
harbor.”); id. at 151 (asserting that “[a] regulatory regime based on administrative law princi-
ples would . . . avoid subjecting departmental decisions to detailed second-guessing by the 
judiciary.”). Professor Rappaport similarly writes that while courts “must promise (and de-
liver) meaningful deference to policy makers’ solutions,” they need not defer when “politically 
created safeguards fail to sufficiently protect the Constitution’s values,” yet fails to elaborate 
on this critically line of demarcation. Rappaport, supra note 17, at 256, 262. More recently, 
Andrew Selbst, addressing local police agency adoption of predictive policing procedures, 
acknowledges the appeal of judicial review but objects to “shift[ing] responsibility . . . from a 
combination of policing agencies and public comment to the courts.” Selbst, supra note 17, at 
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with specificity, a matter of considerable importance given the undeveloped and 
uneven state of local administrative law more generally.176 Local administrative 
units, moreover, vary enormously in their quality and expertise177 and political 
accountability.178  
Finally, New Administrativists, as Professor Slobogin acknowledges, also tend to 
overlook significant political process problems that can mire criminal justice policy 
making.179 Like the New Democratists they also fail to pay due regard to the im-
portant variations in the structures and working dynamics of local governments 
and officials,180 which can have critical importance in the ways in which law and 
policy is formulated.181 Nor should it be overlooked that voter engagement in local 
election contests is even less than in state and national elections.182 Low turnout 
undercuts the localist presumption of superior political accountability and 
participatory democracy,183 as well as the likelihood of minority political leaders 
being elected.184  
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the efforts of scholars in both camps to 
increase governmental transparency and accountability are to be commended.185 
                                                                                                             
 
182.  
 176. See Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 572 (2017) 
(noting that “the precise procedural requirements binding local agencies are often surprisingly 
murky”). Of note, the distinctiveness of local governments precludes their administrative law 
from being a simple body-double of the federal government’s. Id. at 574–576; see also id. at 
614 n.227 (noting “the risk of too quickly equating the familiar institutional structures of fed-
eral administrative agencies with a local government structure that can vary significantly.”).  
 177. See id. at 30, 41–43, 55. 
 178. See id. at 49–50; see also id. at 63–64 (noting that local agencies vary in their relation 
to political leaders and that it therefore “may be difficult to hold mayors and city council 
members and other local elected officials directly accountable for administrative actions”).  
 179. Slobogin, supra note 15, at 119 (noting that “the new administrativists are unduly 
sanguine about the ability of legislatures and their delegates to avoid catering to law enforce-
ment interests”).  
 180. In this respect they share a fault of local government law scholars more generally. See 
David Schleicher, Local Government Law’s “Law and __” Problem, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1951, 1954 (2013) (noting inter alia that “there has been too little focus on studying the incen-
tives of local officials or strategic interaction between such officials inside existing govern-
mental structures”). 
 181. See, e.g., Noah M. Kazis, American Unicameralism: The Structure of Local Legisla-
tures, 69 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (highlighting the ways in which the unicameral 
local governing arrangement, in place virtually nationwide, can lack democratic participation 
and internal checks and balances).  
 182. Curtis Wood, Voter Turnout in City Elections, 38 URB. AFF. REV. 209, 223 (2002) 
(estimating that voter turnout in large urban elections is less than thirty-four percent).   
 183. See supra notes 120–131, 151–173 and accompanying text.  
 184. Zoltan Hajnal & Jessica Trounstine, Where Turnout Matters: The Consequences of 
Uneven Turnout in City Politics, 67 J. POL. 515, 524 (2005).  
 185. See EDWARD R. MAGUIRE, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN POLICE 
AGENCIES 31, 76, 90, 99 (2003) (discussing opacity in development of police departmental 
policies). As Rachel Harmon has noted, this lack of accountability is exacerbated by the mas-
sive amount of funding that local police secure from the federal government. Harmon, supra 
note 2.  
2018] FOURTH AMENDMENT LOCALISM 391 
 
So too are their goals of increasing citizen input on policing policy, which has long 
been lacking,186 and urging greater regulation of police practices more generally.187  
Arguably, these functional benefits alone warrant the unconditional embrace of 
localism. As discussed next, however, even assuming that local processes operate 
as advocates hope, according constitutional deference to local policy preferences 
is problematic for a variety of reasons.  
III. ASSESSING LOCALISM’S LIMITS  
Allocating constitutional norm-making authority to local political units shares 
an obvious parallel to federalism, which “assures a decentralized government that 
will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society.”188 
Federalism, which of course pertains to states,189 ideally “increases opportunity for 
citizen involvement in democratic processes; [] allows for more innovation and 
experimentation in government; and [] makes government more responsive by 
putting States in competition for a mobile citizenry.”190 Localism, as Professor 
Richard Briffault has observed, not only serves these goals,191 it actually enhances 
the prospect of them being satisfied.192 As Dean Daniel Rodriguez put it, localism 
is “the intrastate analogue of federalism in American constitutional law.”193 This 
Part assesses the extent to which the instrumental goals of localism, whatever their 
effect in other contexts, play out in the Fourth Amendment context.  
A. Tailoring 
A foremost benefit of localism is its capacity to permit policy and practice to 
reflect local needs and norms. As Justice Black wrote almost a half century ago: 
                                                                                                             
 
 186. Luna, supra note 17, at 587–90 (noting that in poor, inner city communities many lack 
political voice at ballot box and that notice and comment might mitigate this problem).  
 187. Thanks to Professor Christopher Slobogin for highlighting this benefit. 
 188. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).  
 189. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 272 (2000) (noting an “established practice of 
permitting the States, within the broad bounds of the Constitution, to experiment with solu-
tions to difficult questions of policy”).  
 190. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; see also id. (stating that federalism “assures a decentralized 
government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society”).  
 191. See Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns 
in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1315 (1994) (“These virtues of fed-
eralism—participation, diversity, intergovernmental competition, political responsiveness, 
and innovation—are, of course, among the very values regularly associated with local au-
tonomy.”).  
 192. Id. at 1316 (“If grass-roots participation, intergovernmental competition, political 
responsiveness, subnational diversity, and innovation are promoted by the relatively small 
number of relatively large states, then these values out to be far more effectively advanced 
by the empowerment of the far larger number of much smaller local governments.”).  
 193. Daniel B. Rodriguez, Localism and Lawmaking, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 627, 627 (2001). 
For an extended discussion of the parallel, see Rick Su, Intrastate Federalism, 19 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 191 (2016). 
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It is always time to say that this Nation is too large, too complex and 
composed of too great a diversity of peoples for any one of us to have 
the wisdom to establish the rules by which local Americans must 
govern their local affairs . . . . [Courts should observe the] ancient faith 
based on the premise that experience in making local laws by local 
people themselves is by far the safest guide for a nation like ours to 
follow.194 
With the Fourth Amendment, such pluralism arguably has even more appeal 
because, as Professor Andrew Taslitz put it, “[t]he [Supreme] Court has defined 
reasonableness as a balancing of state against individual interests, and it seems 
logical that those interests can vary geographically.”195  
But tying federal constitutional norms to local political preferences carries risks. 
While local governments over time have evinced progressive views, for instance 
recognizing gay rights and enacting antidiscrimination ordinances,196 and 
tempering enforcement of and penalties associated with possessing small amounts 
of marijuana,197 one need not look far for examples of heavy-handedness. Indeed, 
not long ago localities aggressively targeted gays for criminal law enforcement198 
and made no pretense of fair treatment of subpopulations such as African199 and 
Chinese-Americans.200 More recently, localities have resorted to an array of 
                                                                                                             
 
 194. Powell v. Texas, 393 U.S. 514, 547–48 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting); see also City of 
Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 114–15 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he people who 
will have to live with the consequences of today’s opinion do not live in our neighborhoods. 
Rather, the people who will suffer from our lofty pronouncements are people like Mrs. Susan 
Mary Jackson; people who have seen their neighborhoods literally destroyed by gangs and 
violence and drugs.”); id. at 100 (attaching importance to fact that challenged ordinance re-
sulted from a “democratic process” that included “extensive hearings” where “[o]rdinary citi-
zens” spoke of neighborhood problems).  
 195. Taslitz, supra note 11, at 302; see also Barron, supra note 25, at 595–96 (“[E]xpress 
recognition of local constitutionalism may engage local communities more directly in the pub-
lic practice of constitutional interpretation and accord constitutional recognition to the diverse 
conceptions of constitutionalism that local communities embrace.”). 
 196. Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-Zvi, The Geography of Sexuality, 90 N.C. L. REV. 955 
(2012); Michèle Finck, The Role of Localism in Constitutional Change: A Case Study, 30 J. 
L. & POL. 53 (2014).  
 197. Logan, supra note 78, at 325–27.  
 198. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Law and the Construction of the Closet: American Regula-
tion of Same-Sex Intimacy, 1880-1946, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1007, 1038–45 (1997).  
 199. See, e.g., Comm’rs of Washington v. Frank, 46 N.C. 436, 437 (1854) (upholding local 
law for disorderly conduct that imposed a fine on white violators and “thirty-nine lashes” for 
blacks). In backing the law, the North Carolina Supreme Court emphasized the importance of 
localization, stating: 
Different regulations are required in different localities . . . . Slaves compose so 
large a portion of the population of our towns and villages that, in passing rules 
and regulations for their government, much must be left to the judgment and dis-
cretion of those who are to enforce them, in their application to particular cases. 
Id. at 440–41.  
 200. WILLIAM J. COURTNEY, SAN FRANCISCO’S ANTI-CHINESE ORDINANCES, 1850–1950 (1956).  
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“loitering with intent” laws,201 along with aggressive, proactive policing strategies 
such as “zero tolerance.”202 Homeless individuals,203 immigrants,204 and convicted 
sex offenders205 have also been singled out, and recent revelations of police 
overreach in New York, Baltimore, and Ferguson attest to local propensity for 
excess.206  
Localities have also unabashedly used the criminal justice system to extract fees 
and surcharges from criminal offenders, especially poor and minority community 
members suspected of engaging in low-level offenses.207 Similar zeal is evidenced in 
local efforts to secure DNA samples from individuals, independent of state or federal 
regulatory oversight.208  
The foregoing examples are not provided to make the categorical case for local 
oppressiveness; rather, they highlight Madison’s well-justified concern over local 
factionalism,209 what Professor Timothy Zick has called the “geography of purifica-
tion.”210 At the same time, local law enforcement officials, whose job it is to maintain 
                                                                                                             
 
 201. Logan, supra note 72, at 1450.  
 202. Susan A. Bandes, The Challenges of “Quality of Life” Policing for the Fourth 
Amendment, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE FUTURE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 45 
(John T. Parry & L. Song Richardson eds., 2013).  
 203. Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: Constitutional and Historical Analysis of Official 
Efforts To Drive Homeless Persons from American Cities, 66 TUL. L. REV. 631 (1992). 
 204. Lindsay Nash, Expression by Ordinance: Preemption and Proxy in Local Legislation, 
25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 243 (2011); Rick Su, Local Fragmentation as Immigration Regulation, 
47 HOUS. L. REV. 367 (2010).  
 205. Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Collectivism and Ex-Offender Residence Exclusion 
Laws, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1, 5–13 (2006).  
 206. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. Nor, it should be noted, are such var-
iations limited to localities within different states. See, e.g., Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher 
Warshaw, Representation in Municipal Government, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 605, 609 (2014) 
(categorizing U.S. cities on a political spectrum and ranking San Francisco the least conservative 
in its policy preferences and ranking Anaheim among the nation’s ten most conservative cities).  
 207. Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1175, 1185–96 (2014).  
 208. Jason Kreag, Going Local: The Fragmentation of Genetic Surveillance, 95 B.U. L. REV. 
1491 (2015). Local governments, freed of the actual fiscal cost of imprisoning individuals 
(typically absorbed by states), have also been prime drivers of the nation’s decades-long cycle of 
mass imprisonment. See W. David Ball, Tough on Crime (On the State’s Dime): How Violent 
Crime Does Not Drive California Counties’ Incarceration Rates—and Why It Should, 28 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 987, 992–93 (2012).  
 209. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also BRIAN E. DOLLERY & JOE L. 
WALLIS, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 12–13, 39–70 (2001) (surveying 
forms of political process failure among local governments); cf. City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 522–23 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting the “social reality . 
. . that racial discrimination against any group finds a more ready expression at the state and 
local level than at the federal level”); Jamison E. Colburn, Localism’s Ecology: Protecting 
and Restoring Habitat in the Suburban Nation, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 945, 953 (2006) (asserting 
that “localism is more typically factional, opaque, and self-dealing in nature.”).  
 210. Timothy Zick, Constitutional Displacement, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 515, 576 (2009); 
see also id. at 607 (“Territoriality is being used by governments to punish, control, restrict, 
segregate, brand, demonize, and de-legalize certain persons and groups.”).  
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public safety and are rewarded for doing so, are not naturally predisposed to vigilance 
when it comes to civil liberties.211 
In short, history teaches that the very proximity of local decision makers to per-
ceived social ills is at least as likely to inspire harshness as the tempered response 
optimistically hoped for by Meares and Kahan and others.212 Practicing federalism 
“all the way down,” as Professor Gerken acknowledges, is thus a “two-edged 
sword,”213 giving effect to repressive and progressive policies alike. This can be so 
even when, as a formal matter, local democratic or administrative processes function 
properly and boast the proper “pedigree.”214  
Therein lies the rub of equating political responsiveness, transparency, and ac-
countability with constitutional propriety.215 Substituting majoritarian preference for 
constitutional analysis, as the New Democratists would have it, is not only contrary 
to the antimajoritarian purpose of the Fourth Amendment.216 It would permit “the 
political branches to govern without legal constraint,”217 creating what might be 
called a “majoritarian difficulty.” As Professor John Ely observed, “it makes no sense 
to employ the value judgements of the majority as the vehicle for protecting minori-
ties from the value judgments of the majority.”218 And simply because a local popu-
lace might be inured to the negative consequences of a policy or practice,219 the 
                                                                                                             
 
 211. See Harmon, supra note 117, at 811 (“[Police] chiefs are usually better rewarded for 
maintaining order and reducing crime than for protecting civil rights.”). 
 212. See supra notes 120–131, 145–148 and accompanying text.  
 213. Gerken, supra note 44, at 47; see also id. (“Federalism reimagined thus reveals that 
the benefits of minority control can extend not just to Southern racists, but to blacks and 
Latinos . . . .”).  
 214. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 16, at 1837. 
 215. Cf. David H. Bayley, Community Policing: A Report from the Devil’s Advocate, in 
COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 225, 237 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D. 
Mastrofski eds., 1988) (“Local accountability does not substitute for professional, independent 
oversight. Quite the contrary, it makes it more necessary. Americans especially have been 
naïve about this, believing that rectitude was assured by local control. Responsiveness may be 
achieved in this way, but not propriety under law.”).  
 216. See Richard M. Re, The Positive Law Floor, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 313, 330 (2016) 
(“[T]he United States is made up of heterogeneous groups, some of which are more powerful 
than others. In that context, the Fourth Amendment should be a bulwark for unpopular persons 
and minority groups—a source of countermajoritarian rights.”). But see George C. Thomas, 
III & Barry S. Pollack, Saving Rights from a Remedy: A Societal View of the Fourth 
Amendment, 73 B.U. L. REV. 147, 158 (1993) (disputing “anti-majoritarian” view of Fourth 
Amendment).  
 217. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008); see also Christopher Slobogin, Pro-
portionality, Privacy, and Public Opinion: A Reply to Kerr and Swire, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1588, 
1601–02 (2010) (noting that reliance upon public surveys and positive law “does smack of 
putting search and seizure law up for a vote, which runs against the constitutional grain”).  
 218. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 69 
(1980); see also Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295, 298 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977) 
(noting that liberty is threatened not so much by arbitrary acts of government, at odds with 
those governed, as “acts in which the government is the mere instrument of the major number 
of the constituents”).  
 219. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) 
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courts need not be.220 Finally, cutting courts out of the equation raises obvious con-
cern when a local law or policy impacts persons outside the locality who lack politi-
cal voice in formation of the policy.221 
The New Administrativists’ reliance on satisfaction of administrative rule making 
presents similar difficulty. Simply checking the boxes of administrative process reg-
ularity, itself difficult to assess,222 risks substituting what might be mere regulatory 
window dressing223 for substantive constitutional analysis by a court.224 An example 
of the practical effect of such deference is seen with programmatic searches and sei-
zures. Doctrine governing them is already thought unduly skewed in favor of gov-
ernment,225 turning on whether the “primary purpose” of a challenged strategy is 
crime control or administrative in nature.226 Little reason exists to think that jurisdic-
tions will resist characterizing a particular search or seizure as the latter, to redeem a 
                                                                                                             
 
(“And even if the pubic does not welcome the diminution of privacy that new technology 
entails, they may eventually reconcile themselves to this development as inevitable.”); see also 
Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 1309, 1311 
(2012) (noting the public’s unwitting acceptance of a “surveillance society”).  
 220. See People v. Hauseman, 900 P.2d 74, 78 (Colo. 1995) (stating that “strict adherence 
to standard police department procedures . . . does not necessarily satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness standard”).  
 221. See infra notes 330–331 and accompanying text.  
 222. See, e.g., Miriam Seifter, Second-Order Participation in Administrative Law, 63 
UCLA L. REV. 1300, 1333–52 (2016) (discussing reliance on questionably representative 
groups when assessing public participation in rule making).  
 223. In defending his model, Professor Slobogin, for instance, evinces less than total con-
fidence that notice-and-comment citizen input will actually occur. Slobogin, supra note 15, at 
139 (noting that the process will afford “at least a patina of democratic participation”); id. at 
139 n.257 (stating that “some participation is better than none”). Friedman and Ponomarenko, 
in the conclusion of their article, modestly offer that “[e]ven small steps in the direction of 
democratic accountability would go a long way toward a saner system of regulating the po-
lice.” Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 16, at 1907.  
 224. Andrew Crespo has described the regime envisioned by New Administravists as one:  
in which constitutionally grounded judicial review is largely replaced by an ad-
ministrative framework built around law enforcement self-regulation. Rather 
than judging the lawfulness of law enforcement actions directly, courts . . . would 
instead judge the processes by which law enforcement actors judge themselves, 
ensuring that those processes adhere to basic norms of transparency and demo-
cratic accountability, but otherwise deferring to law enforcement actors when it 
comes to the substantive validity of the decisions, policies, and actions that those 
actors pursue. 
Crespo, supra note 13, at 2051. In this respect, proponents align with advocates of “adminis-
trative constitutionalism,” entailing a greater agency role in the interpretation and implemen-
tation of constitutional norms. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 
91 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (2013). 
 225. See, e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. 
L. REV. 254, 296–97 (2011) (asserting that the Court’s balancing is “conducted in a way that 
systematically favors the government”).  
 226. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (requiring courts to dis-
tinguish searches and seizures that have as their “primary purpose . . . [the] detect[ion] . . . of 
ordinary criminal wrongdoing” from those that do not).  
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search, when a reviewing court must simply sign off on whether administrative rule-
making requirements were satisfied.227 
More problematic still, local governments, mindful of the undemanding judicial 
scrutiny entailed in “hard look” review,228 a deferential standard that might or might 
not be apt to accord a particular local agency,229 could be emboldened to pursue pol-
icies that they otherwise would not if subject to traditional judicial constitutional 
scrutiny. As Professor Orin Kerr recently observed in arguing against use of privacy 
legislation as a substitute for judicial analysis:  
If courts look to legislation to interpret the Fourth Amendment, . . . leg-
islation will take on constitutional importance. The prospect that courts 
will interpret the Constitution differently ex post will tend to influence 
the legislation that the elected branches enact ex ante. The resulting feed-
back loop provides a significant argument for independence.230  
Professor Richard Re makes a similar point in critiquing an argument advanced 
in support of the view that state and local positive law (e.g., trespass) should govern 
whether police engage in a search. Re notes that doing so would make doctrine “con-
tingent and jurisdictionally variable”231 and would “create an incentive for lawmak-
ers to adjust privacy protections for private parties so as to expand the power of law 
enforcement.”232 As Re observes, “when democratic pathologies arise, the positive 
law model would have perverse effects, causing defects in regular lawmaking to curb 
the Fourth Amendment.”233  
Ultimately, moreover, the resulting feedback loop stands little chance of being 
tempered by the states where localities are situated.234 State legislatures, as Nestor 
Davidson has observed, “are particularly sensitive to local political communities, and 
because states in the first instance create and empower localities, states may be bound 
                                                                                                             
 
 227. See, e.g., Pieter S. de Ganon, Note, Noticing Crisis, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 573, 596–98 
(2011) (discussing the Court’s failure to critically examine government representations that a 
problem against which search is directed, for example, a drug “crisis” warranting suspicionless 
school drug testing, is supported by factual record).  
 228. Aaron Saiger, Local Government as a Choice of Agency Form, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 423, 
447 (2016) (noting that “‘hard look’ review at its most demanding remains an inquiry only 
into reasonableness, not desirability or wisdom”); see also Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, 
Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1355, 1356–57 (2016).  
 229. See Davidson, supra note 176, at 623 (“Legislative standards that might be acceptable 
when given to a deeply resourced, professionally staffed traditional agency may become more 
troubling when community members are tasked with the decision making.”).  
 230. Kerr, supra note 42, at 1158 (emphasis added).  
 231. Re, supra note 216, at 321. 
 232. Id.  
 233. Id. at 329.  
 234. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government 
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 112 (1990) (“State legislatures and state and federal courts have 
proven unwilling to limit local power or alter the structure of state-local relations, even after 
the effects of local autonomy in promoting interlocal inequality and local parochialism have 
been demonstrated.”). 
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too easily by the shortcomings of their own creations.”235 Legislative reluctance is 
especially likely in light of the fact that local governments pay for policing,236 a mat-
ter squarely within their police power authority.237 Finally, given the likely absence 
of political pressure by business interests, one should not expect to see states rush to 
preempt local policing policy, as seen with rent control or smoking bans,238 or efforts 
to limit fracking.239 Likewise, because policing policy typically lacks high political 
salience, we should not expect to see state-level governmental intervention, as has 
occurred with a hot button issue such as firearms possession.240  
Nor is pushback likely to come from state and local judges,241 who are often sub-
ject to election242 and perhaps inclined to local fealty.243 As noted earlier, courts make 
little use of preemption and conflict doctrine to limit local government authority to 
enact low-level criminal laws,244 and their appetite for intervention is even less likely 
                                                                                                             
 
 235. Nestor Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of 
State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 1019 (2007).  
 236. JEFFREY L. BARNETT & PHILLIP M. VIDAL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT FINANCES: 2011, at 7 (2013), https://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/g11-
alfin.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5EA-VV68] (noting that nationwide local governments spent 
$83.5 billion on police services in 2011, ranking just education as the greatest budgetary fo-
cus); id. at 4 (noting that local governments spend almost seven times as much on policing as 
do states).  
 237. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296 (2000) (recognizing the broad 
power of municipalities in the protection of public health and safety). Although remote, the 
prospect of state intervention regarding local control over public safety policy is not beyond 
the realm of possibility. See, e.g., Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 267 N.W. 25, 32 (Wis. 1936) 
(noting historic local police power authority but stating that “it would be within the compe-
tency of the Legislature if it so desired to entirely rearrange the law of the state with respect 
to these matters”); see also KRANE ET AL., supra note 73, at 1 (“Where the line between an 
appropriate sphere of local action and the authority of state government is drawn has been a 
source of continuous conflict in state capitals.”). 
 238. See Diller, supra note 73, at 1139 (recounting recent instances by state legislatures in 
these areas). 
 239. See Courtney Walmer, Note, Governing Hydraulic Fracturing Through State-Local 
Dynamic Federalism: Lessons from a Florida Case Study, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 867, 869–
70 (2015) (discussing state preemption legislation). 
 240. See Blocher, supra note 33, at 133 (discussing widespread state laws preempting local 
limits on gun possession). 
 241. See Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial 
Scrutiny, 86 DENVER U. L. REV. 1337, 1356 (2009) (“[S]tate courts have long affirmed the 
police powers of home rule local governments to promote health, safety, and welfare . . . .”). 
 242. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How To Read a Statute in a 
Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433, 489 (2012) (noting that approximately ninety percent 
of state and local judges face election of some kind).  
 243. Ethan J. Leib, Localist Statutory Interpretation, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 897, 902, 907 
(2013) (noting that state judges often align with the local rather than state interests).  
 244. See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text.  
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regarding local efforts to regulate their police forces.245 Nor will federal courts exer-
cise oversight; habeas corpus is unavailable in the Fourth Amendment context246 and 
direct review by the U.S. Supreme Court is unlikely given its increasingly paltry 
docket.247  
Finally, it should not escape attention that local policing policy, as with local pol-
icy making more generally,248 can be heavily influenced by profit-motivated private 
industry. For instance, it is now commonplace for private data companies to help in 
the collection, storage, and analysis of data,249 and police departments rush to secure 
the latest surveillance technology created and marketed by private vendors.250  
Another example is found in ongoing efforts by local departments to develop 
DNA databases, with firms eager to capitalize on business opportunities character-
ized by one vendor as “enormous.”251 When local databases operate independently 
of state and federal guidelines, police enjoy much freer rein to secure samples,252 
operating under a “more is better” mentality that benefits both law enforcement 
(touting potential crime control advantages) and the businesses (profits as a result of 
expansion).253  
In this environment, pressure is predictably mounting to expand the scope of in-
dividuals from whom DNA can be collected. In 2013, the Supreme Court allowed 
                                                                                                             
 
 245. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 452 (1990) (contending that a “[l]ocalist ideology . . . crippl[es] the 
willingness of states to take a statewide perspective and displace local authority when consid-
erations of equity or efficiency make it appropriate to do so.”).  
 246. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).  
 247. See Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking 
Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1251 (2012) (stating that “the Court hears fewer cases 
these days than in any other time in [its] modern history” and providing data in support). 
Courts, moreover, have rejected claims that variable laws within a state raise equal protection 
concern. E.g., Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 230 (1964); Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 
22, 31 (1880); City of Baton Rouge v. Williams, 661 So. 2d 445, 451 (La. 1995). 
 248. See Davidson, supra note 176, at 604 (identifying as a key defining feature of local 
agencies the “permeability of the line between public and private within local agencies”); id. 
at 608 (discussing infusion of private actors in work of local agencies). 
 249. See Wayne A. Logan & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Criminal Justice Data, 
101 MINN. L. REV. 541, 547 (2016).  
 250. See Murphy, supra note 43, at 536 (“Most technological surveillance devices are de-
veloped, marketed, and maintained by private sector industries, not nonprofit or government 
entities.”); Matt Richtel, A Police Gadget That Tracks Phones? Shhh! It’s Secret, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/16/business/a-police-gadget-tracks-
phones-shhh-its-secret.html [https://perma.cc/3TCN-BZ66] (discussing promotion and sale of 
“StingRay” devices to local departments, which are used to track the location of cell phones 
without a warrant). 
 251. Kreag, supra note 208, at 1507 (quoting Bode Technology Vice President for Sales 
and Marketing).  
 252. Id. at 1502–03.  
 253. Id. at 1512.  
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police, acting without a warrant, to secure DNA from those arrested for “serious of-
fenses.”254 Expanding this limit would have obvious benefits for industry. As Jason 
Kreag has observed: 
Large [DNA database] firms . . . view local law enforcement databases 
as potential revenue streams, particularly because they promise to pro-
mote the use of DNA beyond violent crimes (sexual assaults and homi-
cides) to property crimes. These firms see a business opportunity in pro-
cessing the evidence swabs collected from property crimes. Indeed, in 
marketing their products, they trumpet the studies that have highlighted 
DNA’s promise for solving these crimes.255  
A locality, hearing the combined pitch of police administrators and business in-
terests, understandably would be susceptible of persuasion in favor of expansion.256 
Collection of familial DNA samples, which allow police to use the DNA of innocents 
to identify suspects,257 would likely follow a similar path. Yet experience teaches 
that any political resistance to these policy shifts would most likely come from those 
most directly affected, politically marginalized segments of the locality without 
much influence.258 
B. Experimentation 
Another touted benefit of localism is its capacity to foster experimentation.259 
Just as “a single courageous State may . . . serve as a laboratory” and undertake 
“novel social and economic experiments” from which other states can draw 
lessons,260 so too can local governments.261 Recently, the construct made famous 
                                                                                                             
 
 254. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465 (2013).  
 255. Kreag, supra note 208, at 1521.  
 256. Risk of political capture, it should be noted, is perhaps especially pronounced at the 
local government level, with its typical smaller-sized, unicameral legislative structure and 
lesser participatory democracy and lack of checks and balances, compared to bicameral bodies 
operative in the state and federal reams. See Kazis, supra note 181, at 69–73. Possibly exac-
erbating matters, local legislative elections are also less subject to partisan competition, com-
pared to their state and federal legislative counterparts. See Schleicher, supra note 173. Local 
elections are also often marked by lower voter turnout. See supra note 182.  
 257. Wayne A. Logan, Government Retention and Use of Unlawfully Secured DNA Evi-
dence, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 269, 277 (2015). 
 258. See supra notes 132–144 and accompanying text; see also Kreag, supra note 208, at 
1539 (“[T]he local citizens who perceive the positive benefits of a local DNA database—re-
duced crime—are more than likely not the same citizens who bear the burdens of local data-
bases.”).  
 259. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1487, 1498 (1987) (“decentralization allows for innovation and compe-
tition in government” and provides sub-federal entities “greater opportunity and incentive to 
pioneer useful changes”). 
 260. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
 261. See Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, 22 J.L. & POL. 1, 
43 (2006) (noting that “if the fifty states are laboratories for public policy formation, then 
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by Justice Brandeis has figured in Professors Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel’s 
“democratic experimentalism,”262 whereby “power is decentralized to enable 
citizens and other actors to utilize their local knowledge to fit solutions to their 
individual circumstance,” with the solutions shared regionally and nationally.263  
Presuming that one accepts that constitutional rights are ripe for experimenta-
tion,264 the viability of the model rests on several key assumptions. One is that a 
local decision-making unit possesses expertise to formulate and implement policy 
worthy of deference.265 As John Rappaport has noted, however, the assumptions 
underlying this purported superiority in the policing context are “contingent and 
qualified.”266 This is so for several reasons, including that political influences “may 
cause policy makers ‘to use the information they possess in distorted ways’”;267 the 
tendency of law enforcement to undervalue individual rights;268 and the lack of 
expertise of most politicians in policing matters.269 Indeed, lending prescriptive 
weight to local expertise can be seen as especially problematic today. As leading 
policing scholar David Bayley has observed, “[s]ince the 1980s, the challenges of 
managing the police have become dramatically more complex in ways that are not 
recognized either by the police or the public.”270 According to Bayley, “[t]he public 
is now demanding a voice in policing at precisely the moment that policing has 
become unprecedentedly more complicated.”271  
Professor Michael Livermore, in his recent article The Perils of 
Experimentation, echoes this concern, noting that the benefits of “inquiry cannot 
be carried out in the abstract, and sound analysis must be based on careful attention 
to a wide range of policy and political dynamics.”272 He urges “a healthy dose of 
                                                                                                             
 
surely the 3,000 counties and 15,000 municipalities provide logarithmically more opportuni-
ties for innovation, experimentation and reform”).  
 262. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).  
 263. Id. at 267.  
 264. But see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 170 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (“I 
have never believed that under the guise of federalism the States should be able to experiment 
with protections afforded our citizens through the Bill of rights.”); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 
312, 338 (1921) (“The Constitution was intended, its very purpose was, to prevent experimen-
tation with the fundamental rights of the individual.”).  
 265. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in 
the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 82 (2011) (“Experimentalism emphasizes stake-
holder participation to elicit and reconcile the diverse views and interests of people distinc-
tively affected by and knowledgeable about the matters in issue.”). 
 266. Rappaport, supra note 17, at 232.  
 267. Id. at 233 (quoting ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 86–87 
(2009)).  
 268. Id.  
 269. Id.; see also SAMUEL WALKER, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 8 
(2005) (noting that most elected officials lack expertise in policing matters).  
 270. David H. Bayley, The Complexities of 21st Century Policing, 10 POLICING 163, 163 
(2016); id. at 166 (“[I]t is obvious that the management of policing has become dramatically 
more complicated in ways that are not generally recognized.”).  
 271. Id. at 170.  
 272. Michael A. Livermore, The Perils of Experimentation, 126 YALE L.J. 636, 708 (2017); 
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public choice skepticism concerning how information will be put to use,”273 citing 
policing as an example.274 Although he does not elaborate, Livermore is justified. 
As commentators have long recognized, the political pathologies at play in the 
criminal justice policy-making process are acute and pervasive.275 With policing in 
particular, jurisdictions have incentive to adopt aggressive policies that are 
inhospitable to perceived undesirables.276 Increasingly pronounced social and 
economic segregation within and between localities,277 certainly inclusive of 
suburban enclaves,278 exacerbates the phenomenon. 
Another basic concern relates to the viability of the experimentalist model itself. 
Over thirty years ago, Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman recognized that political 
leaders, wary of negative results possibly attending an experiment, will free-ride on 
                                                                                                             
 
see also id. at 666 (“[I]t is worth inquiring into whether the relevant policy context is one in 
which the creation of information is likely to have salutary effects on the policymaking process 
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 273. Id. at 652.  
 274. Id. at 658–59; see also Briffault, supra note 234, at 115 (“The sharp differences 
among local governments and the concomitant differences in local needs and abilities render 
general claims about the value, as well as the extent, of local autonomy difficult to sustain. . . 
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 275. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.  
 276. See Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, 
and Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1834 (2005). Research by Adam 
Winkler examining state, local, and federal laws challenged on free speech grounds reflects 
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powerful interest groups by restricting the speech of disfavored minorities.” Adam Winkler, 
Free Speech Federalism, 108 MICH. L. REV. 153, 179–80 (2009). Winkler concluded: 
The problem is that choice and diversity are not necessarily values that should be 
encouraged when it comes to fundamental rights. The right to free speech is sup-
posed to be enjoyed equally by all citizens, regardless of their place of residence. 
In the traditional understanding of the First Amendment, the citizen choice that 
is valued is that which comes from unfettered debate in the marketplace of ideas. 
If state and local governments can restrict speech, the channels of dialogue are 
restricted and choice diminished, not enhanced. 
Id. at 183.  
 277. See Claude S. Fischer, Gretchen Stockmayer, Jon Stiles & Micahel Hout, Distinguish-
ing the Geographic Levels and Social Dimensions of U.S. Metropolitan Segregation, 1960–
2000, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 37, 54 (2004); Daniel T. Lichter, Domenico Parisi & Michael C. 
Taquino, Toward a New Macro-Segregation? Decomposing Segregation Within and Between 
Metropolitan Cities and Suburbs, 80 AM. SOC. REV. 843, 844 (2015). 
 278. On the impact of land use controls, tax policy, and the like with particular regard to 
the creation and proliferation of suburbs, see COLIN GORDON, MAPPING DECLINE: ST. LOUIS 
AND THE FATE OF THE AMERICAN CITY 9–10 (2009); SIDNEY PLOTKIN, KEEP OUT: THE 
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H. FREY, DIVERSITY EXPLOSION: HOW NEW RACIAL DEMOGRAPHICS ARE REMAKING AMERICA 
159 (2014).  
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the experiments of others.279 Risk of free-riding, Professors Brian Galle and Joseph 
Leahy observed more recently, is especially likely when the policy or practice in 
question is relatively easy to replicate.280 
Professor Slobogin acknowledges that not all local governments will have the 
wherewithal to generate their own policies,281 and will “piggyback on policies devel-
oped by their larger counterparts and other policy organs.”282 When this occurs, how-
ever, the public participation and tailoring that proponents posit as critically im-
portant is short circuited,283 and jurisdictions could well adopt ill-suited policies.284 
Worse yet, policies might remain in place as a result of ossification, a problem long 
recognized by administrative law scholars.285  
On the other hand, if in fact localities do engage in experimentation, there can be 
difficulties. As a threshold matter, they might not learn of one another’s experiments 
and outcomes. Professor Hannah Wiseman, echoing concerns of other scholars,286 
has noted the problem of “regulatory islands,” which lack necessary information on 
“the suite of potential policy approaches already tried or proposed—not to mention 
information about implementation processes and the results of policy processes.”287 
With policing policy in particular, there is reason to expect that localities will engage 
in competiveness,288 not the cooperative spirit necessary for sharing to take place.289  
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cation is a real problem that has a wide variety of serious adverse effects.”). 
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The experiments themselves, moreover, can present another concern: an indeter-
minacy of scale problem. While advocates do not specify which level of government, 
or entity, should bear responsibility for norm creation, they appear to focus on mu-
nicipalities,290 which number in the tens of thousands.291 Local constitutionalists, for 
their part, appear amenable to accepting neighborhoods292 or even sublocal “special 
purpose institutions” as worthy norm-creators.293 If the goal is to ensure participation 
and optimize the likelihood of consensus,294 micro-ization of political unit is sensi-
ble,295 yet as noted earlier even defining “community” can be pose major chal-
lenges.296     
Presuming this definitional challenge is surmounted, the multitude of local pref-
erences will present major practical difficulty.297 Professor John Rappaport acknowl-
edges the risk of creating “a patchwork of regulations that will be unduly complex 
and difficult for the Court to oversee,”298 embroiling the judiciary in a “Whac-a-
mole” scenario of perpetually reviewing policies.299 But he dismisses this as “really 
an objection to our federal system, in which state and local authorities exercise police 
powers. Regulation of law enforcement is not a uniquely federal concern that cannot 
be effectively treated without national intervention.”300  
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that neighborhoods defer to block-level norms as long as the criteria for deference are met.”). 
For an early argument in favor of a neighborhood-level system of governance, including police 
functions, see Richard Danzig, Toward the Creation of a Complementary, Decentralized Sys-
tem of Criminal Justice, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1973).  
 293. Gerken, supra note 44, at 29. 
 294. JEFFREY M. BERRY, KENT E. PORTNEY & KEN THOMSON, REBIRTH OF URBAN 
DEMOCRACY 95–98 (1993) (urging use of neighborhood councils for this reason); Matthew J. 
Parlow, Civic Republicanism, Public Choice Theory, and Neighborhood Councils: A New 
Model for Civic Engagement, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 137, 180–81 (2008). 
 295. See Nadav Shoked, The New Local, 100 VA. L. REV. 1323, 1349 (2014) (noting pre-
sumption guided by “instinctive belief that smaller is more beautiful”). 
 296. See supra notes 132–144 and accompanying text (discussing varied definitions of 
“community”); see also STEVE HERBERT, CITIZENS, COPS, AND POWER: RECOGNIZING THE 
LIMITS OF COMMUNITY 55, 72–89 (2006) (noting that police departments define “community” 
differently than residents); Burke, supra note 141, at 1004 (“[I]t is not obvious that residents 
of a geographically-defined region comprise a ‘community’ in anything other than the most 
superficial sense.”).  
 297. See Taslitz, supra note 11, at 302 (“Of course, there are administrative costs associ-
ated with having local variations in rules, and those can be reasons to prohibit such variations 
in some instances.”). 
 298. Rappaport, supra note 17, at 246. 
 299. Id. at 261. 
 300. Id. at 246. 
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Increased judicial caseloads, however, will not be the only problem. Localism 
eliminates a key benefit of traditional federalism—it provides a hierarchical order 
for decisional deference: federal law (when it applies) is supreme, otherwise states 
hold sway. With localism, states are no longer privileged in the federalism equa-
tion,301 leaving the multitude of non-sovereign (or at best semi-sovereign) local po-
litical units to govern preferences.302 When this occurs the power of states to order 
their own internal governance structures is undermined,303 something the Supreme 
Court has frowned upon.304 At the same time, cutting states out of the political over-
sight dynamic has risks of its own, as seen in the ways by which local policing policy 
has been driven by funding and equipment directly provided by federal agencies.305 
C. Tiebout Sorting and Externalities 
Closely related to experimentation is the expectation that decentralization will in-
crease the menu of governmental policies from which a mobile citizenry can 
choose.306 Under political scientist Charles Tiebout’s famous model, individuals will 
“vote with their feet” and live in areas aligned with their public good preferences.307 
This in turn, the theory goes, will result in efficient sorting of preferable government 
                                                                                                             
 
 301. See Davidson, supra note 235, at 980 (“The prevailing view of local governments is 
one of formal legal powerlessness, subject to plenary state authority. In the federalism context, 
this view takes the states as unitary entities within which local governments serve as merely 
convenient instrumentalities of the states, imbued with, at best, reflected sovereignty.”). But 
see Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 931, 964–
78 (2010) (noting cases where Supreme Court attributed local governments semi-sovereign or 
at least autonomous status).  
 302. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 235, at 977 n.62 (“It would be possible to argue that 
localities have no constitutional status whatsoever, but this Article describes their status as 
‘quasi-constitutional’ in recognition of the independent role that the Court has, at times, ac-
corded local governments in constitutional law.”).  
 303. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (“Through the structure of its 
government, and the character of those who exercise government authority, a State defines 
itself as a sovereign.”).  
 304. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999) (renouncing federal capacity to 
“turn the State against itself and ultimately to commandeer the entire political machinery of 
the State against its will”); see also Davidson, supra note 235, at 986 (noting that “the Court 
is increasingly intimating that internal political ordering is a fundamental attribute of state 
sovereignty” and citing cases in support). But see id. at 999–1000 (citing and discussing in-
stances where the Court upheld interferences with ordering of state-local relations).  
 305. Harmon, supra note 2, at 872. 
 306. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458. 
 307. Tiebout, supra note 51, at 418 (“[A]t the local level . . . the consumer-voter moves to 
that community whose local government best satisfies his set of preferences.”).  
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policies,308 and a higher degree of overall preference satisfaction,309 as local govern-
ments “compete” for residents.310 Individuals unhappy with a policy can exercise 
what Albert Hirschman termed an “exit option.”311 
Here, presuming the existence of actual policy variation,312 localism proponents 
enjoy an important practical advantage insofar as it is typically easier and less costly 
to exit a locality than it is to exit a state or nation.313 Noting this, Professor Robert 
Cooter has gone so far as to argue that “[t]he ‘exit principle’ implies the ‘federalism 
of individual rights,’ by which I mean that courts should tolerate more interference 
with individual liberty when the effects are localized.”314  
Although influential, Tiebout’s “pure theory” has been criticized over the years.315 
One concern is that exit is often directly related to economic wherewithal,316 a point 
                                                                                                             
 
 308. Id.; see also Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in 
Local Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 930, 944–45 (1988) (positing that ease of exit at the 
local level “underlies de Tocqueville’s esteem for decentralized administration” and that “exit 
from a locality that has acted invidiously is largely salutary, as it informs the original munici-
pality that its policies require reform”). 
 309. See WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 11–13 (1972).  
 310. See Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People’s Affection: Federalism’s Forgotten 
Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REV. 329, 332, 382 (2003).  
 311. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN 
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 2 (1970); see also Richard Posner, Free Speech in an 
Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 19 (1986) (arguing that local regulation of 
speech is less likely to be onerous because exit is an option); Carol M. Rose, Planning and 
Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 
882–87 (1983) (discussing exit in context of local control of land use decisions).  
 312. See supra Part II.A, B.  
 313. See Rosen, Surprisingly Strong, supra note 30, at 1606–07 (“In general, it is easier to 
exit smaller polities than larger polities,” given the greater moving costs associated with dis-
tance of a change of residence, and less disruption to work, social, family, and other practical 
accoutrements of daily life).  
 314. ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 323 (2000); see also Rosen, 
Surprisingly Strong, supra note 30, at 1610–11 (“Generally speaking, there is less need for 
judicially enforced constitutional protections at lower levels of government, where exit 
costs are lower.”); Kevin J. Worthen, Two Sides of the Same Coin: The Potential Normative 
Power of American Cities and Indian Tribes, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1273, 1285 (1991) (“Be-
cause withdrawal from the local community is easier . . . it is less distasteful for a local 
government to subject its members to community decisions. People who disagree with the 
choices of a particular community can seek a community more compatible with their values 
or they can choose to live in no community at all.”).  
 315. See, e.g., Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking 
the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 515–18 (1991); Jerry 
Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 267–72 (1993); Paul W. Rhode 
& Koleman S. Strumpf, Assessing the Importance of Tiebout Sorting: Local Heterogeneity 
from 1850 to 1990, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1648 (2003). 
 316. See Briffault, supra note 245, at 420 (noting that mobility “is constrained by a va-
riety of economic . . . factors that tend to affect poorer people more than affluent ones”).  
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with particular salience with policing given its predominant focus on poor and mi-
nority community members.317 Another is the failure of Tiebout’s model to take suf-
ficient account of the ways in which local policies impose negative externalities, or 
spillovers, on other localities.318  
Unlike lower taxes, public parks, and the like, which Tiebout posited as bases to 
attract “consumer-voters,” criminal justice policy can be motivated by a desire to 
expel.319 As a consequence, the prospect of exit does not function to temper policy 
overreach.320 Rather, exit—of potential undesirables—could well be the goal. If 
crime-prone individuals (whether residents or visitors) commit crimes elsewhere,321 
the displacement qualifies as a negative externality or spillover,322 militating 
against localization.323 The upshot is that local governments, while often oblivious 
to their externalities,324 in this instance have an affirmative interest in generating 
                                                                                                             
 
 317. Although criminal procedure rights might seem an unlikely motivating factor in 
voting with one’s feet, it is not unprecedented, as evidenced in the migration of southern 
African-Americans to the North from the late nineteenth through the mid-late twentieth 
century. See DANIEL M. JOHNSON & REX R. CAMPBELL, BLACK MIGRATION IN AMERICA: A 
SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC HISTORY 84–85 (1981).  
 318. See Briffault, supra note 245, at 426–27; Richard Schragger, Consuming Government, 
101 MICH. L. REV. 1824, 1834 (2003). Suffice it to say, not all externalities are negative in 
nature. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal 
Federalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 57, 62–63 (2014) (arguing that political units can, by adopting 
a minority position, such as with gay rights, “generate friction” and “spur[] democratic en-
gagement”). 
 319. See supra notes 198–206 and accompanying text. 
 320. See Rosen, Surprisingly Strong, supra note 30, at 1611 (identifying as an optimal 
condition for tailoring “the threat of exit tam[ing] polities’ policy choice”).  
 321. See ELIZABETH NEWLON, SPILLOVER CRIME AND JURISDICTIONAL EXPENDITURE ON 
LAW ENFORCEMENT: A MUNICIPAL LEVEL ANALYSIS (2001); Kate J. Bowers & Shane D. 
Johnson, Measuring the Geographical Displacement and Diffusion Benefit Effects of Crime 
Prevention Activity, 19 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 275 (2003); William C. Wheaton, 
Metropolitan Fragmentation, Law Enforcement Effort and Urban Crime, 60 J. URB. ECON. 1 
(2006).  
 322. On spillovers resulting from decentralization more generally see, for example, 
Briffault, supra note 191, at 1321 (“[V]irtually by definition, an increase in decentralization 
increases the possibility of spillovers” that impose costs on unrepresented parties.); Samuel 
Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1355 
(2006) (recognizing situations “when the experiments of democracy within one state’s borders 
have spillover effects that adversely affect citizens of other states”).  
 323. See Guillaume Cheikbossian & Nicolas Marceau, Why Is Law Enforcement Decen-
tralized? 3 (CIRPEE, Working Paper No. 07-19, 2007), http://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1007699 [https://perma.cc/CFT3-CBS2] (“[W]e note that 
provided law enforcement entails displacement or diffusion, then it is likely that there would 
be benefits to its centralization as a central authority could internalize negative—spatial 
displacement— . . . externalities between regions.”); see also Briffault, supra note 245, at 
427–28 (“Thus, full internalization of all local actions and full participation for all those 
affected by local decisions would tend to require larger local units. Yet both economic and 
political localism are predicated on the smallness of local governments.”).  
 324. See Briffault, supra note 245, at 434 (“Local governments will not, as long as they 
need not, take extralocal effects into account, give a voice to nonresidents affected by local 
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them. Indeed, to the extent a policy renders a jurisdiction more attractive to 
potential capital investment,325 one should expect to see a race-to-the-bottom 
scenario familiar in other contexts.326 Left unchecked, local control over police, 
and judicial deference to local policy, could well engender a toxic state of affairs 
long ago envisioned by political scientist James Q. Wilson whereby police are 
made an “instrument of inter-neighborhood conflict.”327 
Nor, finally, should such externalities be conceived in insular terms. Given the 
transitoriness of modern life, nonresidents traveling to or through a jurisdiction 
will feel the effects of policy. As Professor Richard Briffault observes: 
[P] eople are regularly involved in more than one locality in the course 
of their daily lives. We are not just a mobile society; we are also a 
commuter society. Most people no longer reside in the locality in which 
they work, and they no longer confine their weekly travel, shopping, 
social, cultural or other routine activities to the community in which they 
reside.328  
Functionally, people who pass through are political outsiders who, even though 
their liberty and privacy can be negatively affected by a policy, will likely have no 
say in its creation.329 Indeed, it could be the case that outsiders are singled out for 
                                                                                                             
 
actions, internalize externalities, make compensatory payments for negative spillovers or 
transfer local wealth to other communities in the region to ameliorate fiscal disparities.”).  
 325. See Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, Competition in Law Enforcement and Cap-
ital Allocation, 69 J. URB. ECON. 136, 137 (2011).  
 326. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Race for the Bottom in Corporate Governance, 
95 VA. L. REV. 685 (2009). Competition here is not fueled by a desire to loosen regulation, 
such as occurs when localities wish to lure an industry; rather, competitiveness manifests in 
localities adopting harsher regulations to make themselves less attractive to potential offend-
ers.  
 327. JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW AND 
ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES 283–91 (2d ed. 1978).  
 328. Briffault, supra note 245, at 413. Jerry Frug has written that we should attach less 
significance to boundaries, urging recognition of a “postmodern conception of localities” that 
will encompass individuals’ nonresidential connections, such as to employment locations, 
schools, and social ties. Frug, supra note 315, at 304–38. 
 329. Briffault supra note 245, at 426–27 (“[L]ocal borders cut across densely packed and 
economically and socially intertwined metropolitan areas, virtually guaranteeing that there 
will be externalities and that some people, namely nonresidents, will be excluded from partic-
ipating in the decisions of one of the region’s many local governments though they are inti-
mately affected by these decisions.”); cf. Anderson, supra note 301, at 933 (noting how local 
borders can change to exclude certain citizen subpopulations); Richard Thompson Ford, The 
Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1860–
61 (1994) (arguing that permitting local governments to demarcate boundaries and self-define 
can result in exclusion and racial oppression).  
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targeting,330 neutralizing the internalization of policy effects that Kahan and Meares 
regard as a critical tempering influence.331  
IV. WHITHER FOURTH AMENDMENT LOCALISM 
As noted at the outset, the viability of localism must be assessed in terms of its 
actual workings, not simply hypothesized classroom discussion.332 In this vein, it 
is worth acknowledging that even stalwart proponents can be less than categorical 
in their support. Professor Rosen, for instance, writes that we should merely “soften 
the categorical presumption of One-Size-Fits-All to a rebuttable presumption, so 
that the merits of One-Size-Fits-All versus Tailoring can be examined in the 
incremental manner that is the common law’s wisdom.”333 Rosen thus leaves open 
whether “every constitutional guarantee” is amenable to tailoring.334 Professor 
Blocher is similarly qualified, writing that “there is a general presumption in favor 
of national [rights] uniformity, and the reasons for diverging from that uniformity 
are always specific to the right involved.”335 “[T]he question of whether any 
particular right should be locally tailored is ultimately a specific and normative 
one.”336  
This Part considers whether the Fourth Amendment is one such constitutional 
zone. Concluding that it is not as a general matter, discussion then turns to con-
sideration of whether in some shape or form tailoring, and the localism on which it 
depends, holds promise.  
                                                                                                             
 
 330. Such a prospect would be especially likely when a locality stands to secure financial 
benefit, such as with the forfeiture of property like vehicles. See, e.g., Horton v. City of 
Oakland, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 371, 375 (Ct. App. 2000) (discussing Oakland vehicle forfeiture 
program and noting that “the adverse effect of the ordinance on transient citizens of the state” 
does not “outweigh the benefit to the municipality”). Aggressive targeting of nonlocal motor-
ists for traffic tickets affords another obvious example. See, e.g., Tony Briscoe & Joe Mahr, 
Suburban Speed Traps? See Where Out-of-Towners Are Most Likely To Get Ticketed, CHI. 
TRIB. (June 10, 2016, 11:28 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-speeding-tickets-
non-residents-met-20160609-story.html [https://perma.cc/MG9T-VA5X?type=image].  
 331. See supra Part II.A.  
 332. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.  
 333. Rosen, Surprisingly Strong, supra note 30, at 1637.  
 334. Id. at 1516; see also id. at 1611 (asking “should every constitutional guarantee be 
amenable to Tailoring? Are there any firm floors below which a constitutional protection could 
not be Tailored? If so, what justifies them?”).  
 335. Blocher, supra note 33, at 132; see also Gerken, supra note 44, at 59 (advocating the 
“maintaining [of] a decentralized system but fighting out, issue-by-issue, the areas where we 
think national values cannot be compromised”); Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness, 
NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 27, 2008), https://newrepublic.com/article/62124/defense-looseness 
[https://perma.cc/XBF4-7QT4] (“[N]ationaliz[ing] an issue in the name of the Constitution 
calls for an exercise of judgment . . .  [in cases where] uniform national policy would override 
differences.”).  
 336. Blocher, supra note 33, at 88; see also id. at 127 (noting that instances to date of 
doctrinal tailoring “can be explained based on considerations specific to the right at issue”). 
Professor Nestor Davidson, in urging “localist administrative law,” likewise cautions 
against reflexive trans-substantive application. Davidson, supra note 176, at 610.  
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A. Fourth Amendment Exceptionalism 
The Fourth Amendment is the most commonly litigated constitutional provi-
sion,337 not simply because of the many millions of searches and seizures 
conducted by police annually,338 but because of the important role it plays in 
protecting individual rights and enabling operation of American constitutional 
democracy.  
1. Individual Interests  
The Amendment’s structural role in limiting the power of police to intrude on 
individuals’ lives is of obvious critical importance.339 Being searched or seized by 
police amounts to an accusation of criminal wrongdoing, with understandable trau-
matic effect.340 One must submit to forcible domination by a government agent,341 
even when actually innocent of any wrongdoing.342 
                                                                                                             
 
 337. THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 
xix (2014). 
 338. In 2014, police executed more than eleven million arrests, a conservative number 
because the data exclude arrests for many less serious offenses. Crime in the United States 
2014: Persons Arrested, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-
u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/persons-arrested/main [https://perma.cc/QF2Z-5B8F]. An 
estimated forty million people had contact with police in 2008. CHRISTINE EITH & MATTHEW 
R. DUROSE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE 
PUBLIC, 2008 (2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp08.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/63R3-J8WQ]. 
 339. See David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information: How Not To Think About Privacy 
and the Fourth Amendment, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1069, 1113 (noting that the Fourth 
Amendment helps ensure “respect that others, including governmental officers, show for an 
individual’s sphere of personal sovereignty. Violations of that respect are important not just 
as a matter of principle but because of the tangible effects they can have both on the victim’s 
sense of security and peace of mind”). 
 340. William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. 
L. REV. 1016, 1064 (1995) (“The real harm . . . arises from the indignity of being publicly 
singled out as a criminal suspect and the fear that flows from being targeted by uniformed, 
armed police officers.”); see also Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1486–87 (1996).  
 341. Alexander A. Reinert, Public Interest(s) and Fourth Amendment Enforcement, 2010 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1461, 1489; see also Laurent Sacharoff, The Relational Nature of Privacy, 16 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1249, 1276 (2012) (“When the police stop a person on the street or in 
her car and search either, or when they enter and search a home by virtue of at least the color 
of authority, they say, essentially, ‘I have power over you.’”).  
 342. Innocents, however, understandably experience particular aggrievement. Hugo M. 
Mialon & Sue H. Mialon, The Effects of the Fourth Amendment: An Economic Analysis, 24 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 22, 27 (2007) (asserting that dignitary cost suffered by search of the inno-
cent is greater than the guilty because the latter “cannot feel as badly that this penalty was not 
deserved”). Data collected in connection with the New York City Police Department’s “stop 
and frisk” policy attest to this reality. During an eight-year period (2004–2012) police con-
ducted 4.4 million investigative detentions, performing weapons frisks more than half the time, 
yet, had very low “hit rates” (less than 1% for illegal weapons and 12% for any wrongdoing 
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Even being stopped by police when driving can be an “invasive, frightening, and 
humiliating” experience.343 Being subject to an investigative detention on the street 
similarly denies personal autonomy and freedom of movement,344 and can lead to a 
“frisk” for weapons,345 described by the Court as a “serious intrusion upon the sanc-
tity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment.”346  
An arrest is even more intrusive, coercive, and embarrassing,347 and provides po-
lice the automatic right to search the arrestee’s body and “grab area.”348 When taken 
to a detention facility, which is often unsanitary and dangerous,349 arrestees can be 
subject to a strip search, even if no reason exists to suspect they possess a weapon or 
contraband.350 During the booking process authorities can forcibly compel blood and 
DNA samples containing highly personal information,351 which the Supreme Court 
has acknowledged can foster “anxiety” among those targeted.352 An arrest can have 
a variety of immediate financial hardships353 and time away from work can jeopard-
ize employment.354 It can also adversely affect housing, occupational licensure, and 
student loan opportunities,355 impacting arrestees and their dependents alike.356  
                                                                                                             
 
whatsoever). Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
Survey results highlight the significant negative psychological and emotional impact on those 
targeted, aggravated by the use of force and the feeling of being singled out due to one’s race. 
Amanda Geller, Jeffrey Fagan, Tom Tyler & Bruce G. Link, Aggressive Policing and the 
Mental Health of Young Urban Men, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2321, 2321 (2014). 
 343. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 544 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 344. Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on 
the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1309 (1990). 
 345. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968).  
 346. Id. at 17; see also id. at 24–25 (“Even a limited search of the outer clothing for weap-
ons constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security . . . .”).  
 347. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (de-
scribing arrest as “a serious personal intrusion regardless of whether the person seized is guilty 
or innocent”); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971) (describing arrest as “a pub-
lic act that may seriously interfere with the defendant’s liberty . . . disrupt his employment, 
drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create 
anxiety in him, his family and his friends”). 
 348. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224, 235 (1973).  
 349. See, e.g., Matt Pearce, Missouri Cities, Including Ferguson, Sued over ‘Grotesque’ 
Jail Conditions, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2015, 5:37 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-
ferguson-lawsuit-20150209-story.html [https://perma.cc/X6LT-WFKM].  
 350. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 339 (2012).  
 351. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2177–78 (2016).  
 352. Id. at 2178 (noting that a blood draw “places in the hands of law enforcement author-
ities a sample that can be preserved and from which it is possible to extract information beyond 
a simple [blood alcohol concentration] reading. Even if the law enforcement agency is pre-
cluded from testing the blood for any purpose other than to measure [alcohol content], the 
potential remains and may result in anxiety for the person tested.”). 
 353. Logan & Wright, supra note 207, at 1177.  
 354. Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 307, 313–14 (2016) (noting var-
ious adverse financial consequences of arrest).  
 355. Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1107–
09 (2013).  
 356. Harmon, supra note 354, at 316–17.  
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Finally, not only can arrestees expect to be publicly shamed by having their “mug 
shot” posted on websites operated by police departments,357 newspapers,358 and other 
commercial entities.359 They run the risk of suffering physical harm360 and even 
death.361  
2. Structural Democratic Interests  
More broadly, the Fourth Amendment protects a cluster of interests that are inte-
gral to the functioning of civil society. As Justice Frankfurter noted in Wolf v. 
Colorado, where the Court deemed the Fourth Amendment “implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty,”362 “[t]he security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by 
the police—which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to a free soci-
ety.”363 The Fourth Amendment, as Professor Morgan Cloud observed, 
operates in a concrete dimension, regulating the power of government to 
intrude physically upon people and their property. But it also operates in 
a more abstract dimension . . . [It] enacts a vision of the individual as an 
autonomous agent, empowered to act and believe and express himself 
free from government interference.364 
By its terms, the Amendment protects “the people.”365 Without its protection, 
even the factually innocent—the “group for whom the Fourth Amendment’s protec-
tions ought to be most jealously guarded”366—can be deterred from public engage-
ment,367 refraining from going places, engaging in certain behaviors, or meeting with 
                                                                                                             
 
 357. Jess Bidgood, After Arrests, Quandary for Police on Posting Booking Photos, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/after-arrests-quandary-for-
police-on-posting-booking-photos.html [https://perma.cc/2V73-72RY].  
 358. See, e.g., MUGSHOTS GAINESVILLE, http://mugshotsgainesville.com [https://perma.cc/ 
UR29-R6J8] (website containing pictures and information regarding individuals “taken into 
custody by local law enforcement”).  
 359. See, e.g., Most Recent Florida Bookings, ARRESTS.ORG, http://florida.arrests.org 
[http://perma.cc/6TMV-QSFE].  
 360. Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of 
Force 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22399, 2016) (noting resort by 
police to slapping, grabbing, and pushing individuals into the wall or onto the ground).  
 361. Devon W. Carbado & Patrick Rock, What Exposes African Americans to Police Vio-
lence?, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 160 n.1 (2016) (citing recent instances of deadly force).  
 362. 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).  
 363. Id.; see also Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 15, 23 (2003) (“The Fourth Amendment protects core interests essential to hu-
man flourishing, interests in privacy, property, and freedom of movement.”). 
 364. Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, 
and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 619 (1996).  
 365. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects . . . shall not be violated . . . .”).  
 366. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 482 (2013); see also Colb, supra note 340, at 1476–
1502; Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 
MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1244–48 (1983); Reinert, supra note 341, at 1491–93. 
 367. What Jane Bambauer recently called being subject to “hassle”: “the chance that the 
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particular individuals.368 When covert surveillance by police is involved, the effect 
can at once be more subtle and pervasive.369 As Justice Sotomayor recently noted, in 
the context of government use of a GPS tracking device placed on a suspect’s car, 
“[a]wareness that the Government may be watching chills associational and expres-
sive freedoms.”370  
On the streets, the Fourth Amendment guards against police behaviors that can be 
corrosive of community. In some communities, police officers can be the only gov-
ernmental representatives with whom residents regularly interact.371 When this is so, 
and police behave in a manner thought unfair, there can come disenchantment with 
“the system,” diminishing community members’ willingness to engage in civic 
life,372 including voting.373 Disengagement can also have a negative effect on public 
safety, undermining neighborhood collective efficacy in deterring crime374 and re-
ducing individuals’ inclination to assist police.375 
In short, reading the Amendment in isolation, simply in the criminal procedure 
context, in Akhil Amar’s words, gives short shrift to “how the Fourth Amendment 
                                                                                                             
 
police will stop or search an innocent person against his will.” Jane Bambauer, Hassle, 113 
MICH. L. REV. 461, 464 (2015); see also id. at 466 (“Hassle measures how much pain an in-
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 368. See LU-IN WANG, DISCRIMINATION BY DEFAULT: HOW RACISM BECOMES ROUTINE 104 
(2006) (noting that minorities in particular engage in aversive behaviors “to avoid being de-
tained becom[ing] a part of their daily lives” (emphasis omitted)); L. Rush Atkinson, The Bi-
lateral Fourth Amendment and the Duties of Law-Abiding Persons, 99 GEO. L.J. 1517, 1520 
(2011) (noting how the “limited nature of constitutional protections against government 
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criminal code”).  
 369. See Christopher Slobogin, A Defense of Privacy as the Central Value Protected by 
the Fourth Amendment’s Prohibition on Unreasonable Searches, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 143, 
162 (2015) (“Widespread technological surveillance clearly has stultifying effects, effects that 
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 370. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also 
Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 127 (2008) (defining insecurity as 
“the stifling apprehension and oppression that people would justifiably experience if forced to 
live their personal lives in fear of appearing ‘suspicious’ in the eyes of the state”). For social 
science research supporting this point, see Nicole B. Cásarez, The Synergy of Privacy and 
Speech, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 813, 853–59 (2016). 
 371. See AMY E. LERMAN & VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE 
DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL 55–56 (2014).  
 372. Amy E. Lerman & Vesla M. Weaver, Staying Out of Sight?: Concentrated Policing 
and Local Political Action, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Jan. 2014, at 202, 206; 
Robert J. Sampson, When Things Aren’t What They Seem: Context and Cognition in Appear-
ance-Based Regulation, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 97, 105 (2012).  
 373. LERMAN & WEAVER, supra note 371, at 222–23.  
 374. See Robert J. Sampson, Neighborhood Effects, Causal Mechanisms, and the Social 
Structure of the City, in ANALYTIC SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL MECHANISMS 227, 232 (Pierre 
Demeulenaere ed., 2011).  
 375. See generally TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING 
PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002) (discussing how negative citizen 
interactions with police and police misconduct can lessen citizen willingness to assist police).  
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connects up with the rest of the Constitution.”376 As Professor Monrad Paulsen rec-
ognized over fifty years ago: “All the other freedoms, freedom of speech, of assem-
bly, of religion, of political action, pre-suppose that arbitrary and capricious police 
action has been restrained.”377  
3.  Comparative Distinctiveness 
The Fourth Amendment’s distinctiveness is also evidenced by comparing its con-
stitutional role and application with the First and Second Amendments, the chief 
points of reference for constitutional localists.378  
As noted at the outset, whether material is obscene, and hence undeserving of 
First Amendment protection, is determined on a community-by-community basis.379 
The government’s power to intrude on a person’s First Amendment right is, however, 
protected by an important institutional body: the jury (both grand and petit). A jury, 
comprised of individuals residing in the local vicinage, decides whether the material 
challenged is obscene.380 Juries, since the nation’s origin have guarded against gov-
ernment overreach,381 including perhaps most especially in the freedom of expression 
context, as witnessed in Framing Era prosecutions for seditious libel.382 By compar-
ison, courts alone decide whether the police violated the Fourth Amendment in a 
criminal case.383  
                                                                                                             
 
 376. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 
2 (1997). Indeed, it is no coincidence that the Framing Era search of John Wilkes, a polemicist 
targeted by the British crown for criminal libel, figured centrally in the creation of both the 
First and Fourth Amendments. Sacharoff, supra note 341, at 1257, 1260; see also Marcus v. 
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 377. Monrad G. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRIM. 
L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 255, 264 (1961); see also Crocker, supra note 115, at 308 
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trusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1241 (1988) (Fourth Amendment rights 
“create the environment necessary for other freedoms to flourish”).  
 378. On the utility and limits of constitutional “borrowing” or analogical constitutional 
reasoning more generally, see Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the 
First Amendment Destabilizes the Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49 (2012).  
 379. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.  
 380. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104 (1974). Material is obscene if, taken as 
a whole, it (1) “appeals to the prurient interest”; (2) “depicts or describes” sexual conduct in a 
“patently offensive way”; and (3) “lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). The jury is charged with assessing the first two 
prongs, with a juror “entitled to draw on his own knowledge of the views of the average person 
in the community or vicinage from which he comes.” Hamling, 418 U.S. at 104.  
 381. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 335 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“The primary purpose of the jury in our legal system is to stand between the accused and the 
powers of the State.”).  
 382. See supra note 376.  
 383. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, 
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An argument grounded in the First Amendment’s Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses would be equally unpersuasive. Professor Richard Schragger has 
offered a compelling account of the key norm-setting, constitutional role local gov-
ernments play in protecting both clauses. As he notes, “the Religion Clauses emerged 
from the Founding Congress as local-protecting; the clauses were specifically meant 
to prevent the national Congress from legislating religious affairs while leaving local 
regulations of religion not only untouched by, but also protected from, national en-
croachment.”384 In this way, localization protects free exercise and prevents religious 
establishment: “The decentralization of political authority—and specifically local 
government—is a structural component of religious liberty.”385 The local operation 
of the Fourth Amendment, on the other hand, has never been regarded as playing 
such a structural role.  
Finally, an analogy to the Second Amendment would lack merit for different rea-
sons. Professor Joseph Blocher, drawing support from First Amendment-obscenity 
localism,386 argues that cities should be afforded leeway to enact firearm-restrictive 
laws, allowing rural areas to afford residents more Second Amendment protection.387 
Blocher bases his argument on two main points. First, in general, urban and rural 
areas have distinct public safety needs and “gun cultures,” politically and sociologi-
cally, with urban areas often being more amenable to imposing limits on gun posses-
sion rights.388 Second, building upon the originalist perspective used by the Court in 
Heller389 and McDonald,390 Professor Blocher notes instances of what he sees as an 
urban-rural dichotomy, dating back to before the Framing Era, manifest in greater 
limits imposed on the rights of urban gun owners,391 owing in large part to the “par-
ticular risks of gun use in densely populated areas.”392  
Assuming the accuracy of Professor Blocher’s account,393 the model lacks per-
suasive force here. On the sociocultural question, it remains an open question 
                                                                                                             
 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 10.5(b), at 613 (4th ed. 2015). Juries do of course play a role in Fourth 
Amendment-based civil rights actions against police and their departments. See, e.g., Pearson 
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).  
 384. Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Reli-
gious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1823 (2004).  
 385. Id. at 1831; see also id. at 1815 (arguing that decentralization “views local govern-
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norms”). 
 386. Blocher, supra note 33, at 90.  
 387. Id. at 104.  
 388. Id. at 90–107.  
 389. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 594–95 (2008) (invalidating District 
of Columbia’s ban on firearm possession in the home). 
 390. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 792 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(holding that Second Amendment applies to states and localities and invalidating local law 
banning firearm possession in the home).  
 391. Blocher, supra note 33, at 108–21. 
 392. Id. at 99–100.  
 393. See Michael P. O’Shea, Why Firearm Federalism Beats Firearm Localism, 123 YALE 
L.J. ONLINE 359, 365 (2014) (noting that “many of the prohibitions Blocher lists were simply 
general prohibitions on discharging firearms in settled areas,” not limiting possession of fire-
arms).  
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whether geographic distinctions exist over the proper meaning and application of the 
Fourth Amendment. While it might be true that individual residents of different ge-
ographic domains harbor varying views, it cannot be said with any degree of certainty 
that distinct “cultures” exist.394 Nor does history provide an analytic justification for 
tailoring. Even assuming the propriety of Fourth Amendment originalism,395 the his-
torical record provides scant support for a localist orientation. While Professor 
Michael Mannheimer has made a persuasive case that in 1791 federal search and 
seizure authority varied significantly on the basis of subnational  preferences,396 the 
variability emanated from and reflected variations at the state—not the local 
—level.397  
* * * 
In sum, the Fourth Amendment protects a range of critically important rights af-
fecting individuals, their communities, and civic life more generally. This is not to 
say that the First and Second Amendments do not hold equal importance. Nor is it to 
say that Fourth Amendment judge-made doctrine has always been an effective guard-
ian of citizen rights,398 or that it is the sole or perhaps even primary limit on police 
behavior.399 And, certainly, Fourth Amendment doctrine should not be frozen in am-
ber, oblivious to evolving public preferences as expressed in local democratic or ad-
ministrative processes. Rather, it is to say that Fourth Amendment protections differ 
in ways that counsel against judicial deference to local preference. Indeed, the dif-
ferences are such that some parents, fearing for the safety of their children when 
engaging with police, feel obliged to have “the talk” with them beforehand,400 a need 
hard to envisage with liberties protected by the First and Second Amendments.  
                                                                                                             
 
 394. For instance, residents of perhaps more politically conservative areas, such as suburbs, 
might in theory support aggressive policing and limited Fourth Amendment rights, but they 
might not do so when they themselves are on the receiving end. By the same token, those of a 
more libertarian bent might object in principle. See RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN 
CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND PRIVACY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016).  
 395. See supra note 113 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., M. Blane Michael, Reading 
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 396. See Mannheimer, supra note 60, at 1232.  
 397. See id. Professor Mannheimer notes, moreover, that, at least until the 1930s, federal 
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law. Id. at 1290–91.  
 398. See supra notes 111–119 and accompanying text.  
 399. See Harmon, supra note 2 (noting the many rules, policies, and regulations that oper-
ate subconstitutionally on police).  
 400. Jeannine Amber, The Talk: How Parents Raising Black Boys Try To Keep Their Sons 
Safe, TIME (July 29, 2013), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2147710,00 
.html [https://perma.cc/P2Y9-RMNM]. 
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B. “Leveling Up” Fourth Amendment Doctrine 
Having made the case that Fourth Amendment localism is ill-advised, is it fore-
gone that strict national uniformity is the only alternative? In answering, it must first 
be acknowledged that Fourth Amendment doctrinal uniformity has always been more 
myth than reality. As Part I demonstrated, whether the Justices like it or not, Fourth 
Amendment rights do “vary from place to place and time to time,”401 subjecting cit-
izens to “arbitrarily variable protection.”402  
This variability, what Ronald Dworkin in another context referred to as “check-
erboard laws,”403 generates a number of concerns. Perhaps most important, basic rule 
of law expectations are undercut. While state search and seizure constitutional norms 
can and do vary,404 here it is the federal Fourth Amendment that varies, defying, in 
Justice O’Connor’s words, the expectation that “a single sovereign’s laws should be 
applied equally to all.”405  
While troubling in principle, the variation and indeterminacy it spawns can have 
major practical importance in individuals’ everyday lives. It is one thing to have 
rights vary based on one’s passing into a discernible zone, such as a military base, 
Indian reservation, or public school building,406 or even crossing a state jurisdictional 
boundary.407 It is quite another thing, in our highly mobile society, for rights to hinge 
on the inchoate bounds of “community” (or, indeed, town or city given the typical 
lack of clear demarcation).408  
When the nature and scope of Fourth Amendment rights vary, one “cannot know 
the scope of . . . constitutional protection,”409 a deficit assuming particular im-
portance when individuals become subject to a regulatory regime that is more rights 
restrictive than they are accustomed to. More problematic still, such expectations are 
subject to the vicissitudes of political branch agendas, which of course can quickly 
change.  
                                                                                                             
 
 401. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 172 (2008) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 
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Because of this, if Fourth Amendment localism is to have a place anywhere, it 
should be when it functions in a liberty-enhancing manner. Something like this ap-
proach was advocated by Justice Stevens, who in several decisions argued that state 
courts, when construing and applying the federal constitution, should be empowered 
to adopt a more right-generous position than the Supreme Court.410 Justice Stevens 
reasoned that state courts should, as they do when interpreting their own state con-
stitutions, have the ability to provide their citizens with more in the way of federal 
constitutional protection, allowing rights to be tailored “in the light of local condi-
tions,”411 without impact on other states.412 According to Justice Stevens, “[f]ederal 
interests are not offended when a single State elects to provide greater protection for 
its citizens than the Federal Constitution requires.”413  
The approach has been endorsed by a number of commentators414 and has consid-
erable appeal. First, while adopting it would generate constitutional variability, it 
would avoid the travel-notice difficulties just noted. For example, assume that a lo-
cality acquires new technology that can, from afar, detect guns on the bodies of pass-
ersby (without touching them physically).415 Assume further that, while the question 
of whether use of the device constitutes a search (requiring a warrant) has yet to 
addressed by the Supreme Court,416 the local government—by means of popular vote 
or a process satisfying administrative law requirements—requires that a warrant be 
secured. 
If police were to use the device to scan a pedestrian, without first securing a war-
rant, and an unlawful gun were discovered, a reviewing court would deem the war-
rantless search unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. If, on the other hand, 
police failed to secure a warrant and used the device on an individual to discover an 
unlawful gun in another locality, which did not elect to impose a warrant require-
ment, a reviewing court would not be obliged to defer to the local preference.  
Such an approach would allow the benefits touted by localists—enhanced public 
participation, democratic accountability, transparency, and experimentation—to ac-
crue. With respect to the latter, for instance, local governments could experiment 
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with a policy that is more protective of individual rights, and, because any ill effects 
of the policy would be felt most directly in the locality itself (for instance, in the form 
of possibly increased criminal activity), they would actually be internalized.417 
Presuming experimentalism functions as it should,418 a locality could thus serve as a 
norm entrepreneur vis-à-vis other localities in a given state and other states as well.419 
Finally, deferring to local rights-enhancing norms would mitigate a long-held 
concern about the effect of federal constitutional incorporation doctrine, voiced most 
famously by Justice John Marshall Harlan (II). In a number of Warren Court-era 
decisions Harlan worried that providing “elbow room [to States] in ordering their 
own criminal systems”420 would result in the watering down or dilution of federal 
rights when applied to the federal government and other states.421 Under the approach 
advocated no dilution would occur; indeed, if the local policy caught on elsewhere, 
there would be an accumulated increase in protections.422  
Adopting such an approach would of course not be immune to critique. For one 
thing, it would, as Justice Scalia observed when jousting with Justice Stevens, “ben-
efit[] criminal defendants” alone.423 It would also institutionalize disuniformity, not 
only between states, but also within states, and, because infusion of the local norm 
would affect the Fourth Amendment, it would bind not only state courts but federal 
courts in the jurisdiction as well.424  
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taining that incorporation has resulted in dilution of the Bill of Rights’ original rigorous regime 
of federal rights).  
 422. Cf. Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 318, at 62–63 (arguing that interjurisdictional 
norms can “generate friction, and friction has its uses in a democratic system” because it can 
“spur[] democratic engagement”). 
 423. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 185 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring). But see Florida v. 
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Adopting the model would also present the practical challenge of differentiating 
a liberty-enhancing, from liberty-curtailing, local policy. As a practical matter, doing 
so should not be too difficult. Violation by police of a local norm, embodied in a 
limit on their authority or a requirement they must satisfy, would suffice. The job of 
the judiciary, however, might not always be quite so clear cut. For example, a court 
could be faced with a local policy that at once broadens the liberty of some and cor-
respondingly impairs the liberty of others. The Supreme Court has faced the diffi-
culty on several occasions, requiring the balancing of one right against another.425 
Precisely how the competing demands would be resolved is beyond the scope of 
discussion here, but, as noted, the undertaking is not without judicial precedent.  
Finally, the shift would necessitate a change of heart by the Supreme Court, which 
has charted an inconsistent course with localism. With programmatic searches and 
seizures, such as auto inventories and auto checkpoints, the Court has signaled its 
willingness to defer to local policy makers.426 With suspicion-based policing, on the 
other hand, the Court has refused to allow application of the Fourth Amendment to 
turn on local rules regulating police, deeming them constitutional “trivialities.”427 
Aligning the two doctrinal areas would be an added benefit of going local in the 
limited manner outlined above.  
CONCLUSION 
Academic commentary regarding the Fourth Amendment finds itself at a curious 
place. Just as the world is becoming increasingly globalized in its orientation, as wit-
nessed in the extraterritorial application of U.S. criminal law428 and global constitu-
tionalism,429 several leading scholars have argued in favor of localizing the regula-
tion of police search and seizure authority.430 In doing so, they point to a variety of 
instrumental benefits, including tailoring of policy to fit the preferences and needs of 
local communities, as well as increased governmental transparency, accountability, 
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 428. See PETER ANDREAS & ETHAN NEDELMANN, POLICING THE GLOBE: CRIMINALIZATION 
AND CRIME CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 5 (2006).  
 429. See Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2504 (2005) 
(condemning “legal spatiality” for being “at odds with contemporary concepts of jurisdiction, 
with the intensifying trend of globalization, and with our most cherished principles of consti-
tutionalism”).  
 430. With respect to information gathering more generally in the global context, concern 
has arisen that reactionary governments indulge in “data localism” to make it easier to get 
information on and surveil their citizens. Andrew Keane Woods, Against Data 
Exceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV. 729, 751–53 (2016).  
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experimentation, and civic engagement. Localism, moreover, reflects the practical 
reality that local governments dominate the everyday lives of Americans,431 affecting 
crucial policy areas such as land use, education, and public safety more generally.  
With public safety, however, and Fourth Amendment doctrine limiting police au-
thority in particular, localism presents considerable difficulty. Most problematic is 
when local preferences, instantiated in Fourth Amendment doctrinal norms, have lib-
erty-infringing effect. For this reason, if localism is to figure anywhere, it should be 
to hold police accountable for violation of locally generated limits on their author-
ity.432 Otherwise, localization of Fourth Amendment doctrine, advanced as a tonic 
for current inadequacies of judge-made doctrine, could well be far worse than the 
disease itself.  
 
                                                                                                             
 
 431. See Barron, supra note 25, at 490 (“[O]ur towns and cities are what we know them to 
be: important political institutions that are directly responsible for shaping the contours of 
‘ordinary civic life in a free society.’” (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996))); 
Briffault, supra note 191, at 1318 (“In most states, local governments operate in major policy 
areas without significant external legislative, administrative, or judicial supervision.”).  
 432. Indeed, the likelihood of localities, especially large urban municipalities, acting to 
expand rights in such a manner could well be on the upswing in response to the increasingly 
conservative state and national political landscape. See Corey Brettschneider, Local and State 
Government Can Protect the Constitution from Trump, TIME (Nov. 30, 2016), http:// 
time.com/4584803/donald-trump-states-rights [https://perma.cc/X2SX-VVVY]. Thanks to 
Professor Joe Blocher for highlighting this possibility.  
 
